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Abstract
The Internet is a complex network, with both physical and virtual aspects, and is
composed of a vast community of individuals at various levels. This complexity makes
exploring ethical issues on the Internet difficult because the many relationships that occur
among the individual Internet entities make Internet governance difficult and varied. But the
social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau can
provide a practical way of understanding Internet governance by investigating these
relationships that have formed among the individuals of the Internet through their
interactions.

Previous research investigated using social contract theory for Internet

governance, but it was limited to Rousseauean social contract theory and it did not give due
consideration to the physical structure of the Internet which contributes to existing Internet
governance.

Research conducted for this thesis shows that Hobbesian and Lockean

principles are also at work on the Internet, and it shows how the physical aspect of the
Internet must be considered along with the virtual aspect of the Internet. This research
showed that it is possible to understand the Internet, both its physical and virtual aspects, and
the various relationships of individual Internet entities at all levels through the classical
social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. This understanding then makes it
possible to navigate the complexity of Internet governance as a first step in exploring Internet
ethics.
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Chapter 1-Introduction
When I first decided to pursue a Philosophy degree after earning Computer Science
degrees and working as a software engineer, my simple goal was to explore how to
successfully merge ethics and technology. It has long been my personal opinion that humans
are quick to embrace new technology because it‟s faster or better before fully understanding
the ethical considerations of using that new technology. Now that I work in computer
security, I turned my attention to the Internet because it has become a haven for identity theft,
viruses, privacy concerns, and other ethical quandaries. I set out to explore how either an
existing ethical system, such as Utilitarianism, or a new ethical system could be used to
address ethical issues in the Internet; but, I quickly realized that this problem is more
complicated than I had originally thought. At this point, I decided that I needed to first
understand how interactions and relationships occur on the Internet before understanding
how to investigate ethical issues on the Internet. What my research confirmed, and what this
thesis demonstrates, is that one way to understand the complexity of the Internet is through
classical social contract theory. Through the lens of classical social contract theory, the
complexities of the Internet and the various levels and relationships can be managed in a
more practical way; and, this way of understanding the Internet can provide a foundation to
investigate ethical issues on the Internet.
To provide some necessary background, part of the complication in understanding
ethical issues on the Internet resulted in how the Internet first began.

The Advanced

Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was first conceived as a method of
allowing researchers to benefit from supercomputers at various geographic locations by
connecting them through a network. The first ARPANET consisted of only four nodes at the
1

following locations: the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA); the Stanford
Research Institute; the UC Santa Barbara; and the University of Utah. With this network in
place, researchers in UCLA could benefit from computing resources in the University of
Utah, for example. From those humble beginnings in 1969, the Internet as we know it today
was begun (ARPANET).

In the past 41 years, the Internet has grown from a 4-node

research-oriented network to a network composed of thousands of computers that is used for
a variety of tasks including research, financing, and social networking. But now that it is so
vast, it cannot be organized and controlled as easily as the original 4-node ARPANET, which
makes present Internet governance complicated. This complication in Internet governance is
a first difficulty in better understanding the complexity of emerging ethical issues that are
bound up with ever-increasing Internet use, which is why I turned to classical social contract
theory as it has a history of exploring practical governance issues in communities.
Despite the complication of governance, the Internet has certainly given humanity
many benefits. Every day the Internet is used by many millions of people to perform
research for school, check their bank accounts, shop, and to connect with friends from far-off
places. Internet electronic (or e-) mail has allowed people to connect with each other more
easily and quickly than the postal service. People are also staying socially connected with
websites like www.facebook.com and www.myspace.com, social networking sites that allow
people to post biographies and view other people‟s biographies1. For the first time in history,
ordinary people can connect to people in other countries regularly and quickly. On websites
like www.kiva.org, people can lend money to people in other nations to help them defeat

1
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poverty2. Even corporations and companies are connecting through the Internet. It is rare to
find a business that does not have its own website to promote its products. Websites like
www.amazon.com and www.ebay.com have even made online buying and selling a practical
reality3. I personally know people who make their living or supplement their income by
selling on eBay®. And, I‟m sure you know someone close to you who also buys and sells on
eBay®. But while the Internet has connected the world and its people in many different
ways, it has created an environment that cannot be practically regulated morally. As noted
before, Internet governance is problematic; but, another reason Internet ethical issues are
complicated is that the Internet is composed of individuals on different levels.
Because the Internet is composed of individuals, a main advantage of the Internet is
that it is decentralized. Any person, any company, any government, and any country can
participate and interact with the Internet; anyone has the ability to host a website. However,
there is no ultimate central authority that controls the information that is available on the
Internet or how it is structured, which is why governance is difficult because there is no
ultimate authority to provide top-down management. Additionally, the fact that the Internet
is also international creates problems in legal regulation. For example if a hacker 4 in India
breaks into a computer in Russia via a computer network in Brazil, under what country‟s
laws should the hacker be brought to justice? The hacker is ultimately responsible, but do
the owners of the networks the hacker used share responsibility in the hacker‟s actions?
2
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www.amazon.com is a registered property of amazon.com. www.ebay.com and eBay® are registered
properties of eBay®.
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A hacker is a person who is capable of bypassing computer security to achieve an objective, such as stealing
information, breaking into a bank account, or spreading misinformation. Most hackers that are malicious are
dubbed crackers (for criminal hackers). Ethical hackers are people that use these skills to test computer security
for clients (with their permission and knowledge) so that the client can improve computer security against
malicious hackers.

3

Because there is no ultimate central regulation authority, it is very difficult to control what
happens on the Internet because of the decentralization; this decentralization also contributes
to difficulty in navigating ethical issues on the Internet.
But, the decentralization of the Internet serves a clear purpose in allowing the Internet
to be used in sharing information and providing other services to all of its users. Since the
Internet is decentralized, it is highly adaptable and functional. For example, a person is able
to access his personal e-mail inbox anywhere in the world. Also if a part of the Internet is
down, it is usually limited to a certain region. The Internet as a whole never goes down
completely. This situation will be explained further, but it results from there being multiple
redundant paths for information to travel across the Internet because of the underlying
physical infrastructure of the virtual Internet. But, these underlying redundancies also ensure
that there are many different relationships and interactions that can result on the Internet. At
this point, understanding that the Internet is decentralized and that it can promote various
relationships and interactions, I decided to understand how people interact on the Internet and
how the Internet is organized by applying classical social contract theory to the Internet. As
noted earlier, the Internet is composed of invidual entities on many levels: individuals;
companies; countries; etc. Classical social contract theory has explored how individuals can
form practical communities for survival and governance. As such, I explored classical social
contract theory as a way of understanding how the individuals of the Internet interact in a
community. By understanding this community, it then becomes possible to explore ethical
issues of the Internet through classical social contract theory.
The philosophers Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau all
developed social contract theories to show how people form governments to solve the
4

problems that living in a natural state entail. They understood that in the state of nature
people are left on their own to ensure their own survival and achieve their own goals. But
when governments are instituted, the governments allow for a community to provide for the
people and protect them better than they can on their own in the state of nature. In this way,
people form governments to improve their living conditions. As the Internet is decentralized
and largely unregulated, for the purposes of this project I define it is a modern state of nature
with regards to the Internet users as they are individual entities interacting on a level field.
But, I confirmed that there is an implicit social contract that allows for Internet users to
interact with each other in this state of nature, despite some complications.
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all recognized that a central authority was necessary to
organize people and create a stable community. In the United States of America, which is
partly based on Locke‟s social contract theory, each city and state and, of course, the nation
has a central government. At any group level, even in companies, people can recognize a
central authority for guidance and to relay their viewpoint. Authority recognition is a very
important characteristic of a community. Unfortunately, the decentralized nature of the
Internet means there is no central authority. While people and companies are in charge of
controlling their own networks, there is no ultimate authority on the Internet to which all
people, all companies, and all nations must answer. Because there is no ultimate central
authority, there are no universally written laws or regulations on Internet behavior and ethics.
An additional drawback to this decentralization is that trust becomes problematic on
the Internet. It is difficult to place trust in something when you cannot recognize it. In the
physical world, people can take their issues and grievances to city representatives, state
representatives, and national representatives. As such, they can personally recognize the
5

representatives‟ authority and understand that their representatives can help them. The
people are able to place their trust in the representatives and hold them accountable. But, if
the people cannot recognize authority on the Internet, in what do they place their trust?
An additional problem with trust on the Internet is that it is very easy to be
anonymous on the Internet. For example if a person posts a picture of another person on the
Internet and claims that the photograph is of himself, it is very difficult for someone who has
never met the person to spot the deception. The Internet user would attempt to validate the
picture through other Internet sources or outside sources, like books, magazines, or movies,
but there can be no absolute certainty unless the Internet user actually meets the person in the
physical world. The picture could be of the person, but perhaps the photograph is 10-years
old. The Internet user would not know for certain unless he meets the person because in the
virtual world of the Internet it is possible to be anonymous. How then can you place trust in
the Internet? Yet trust is an essential principle on the Internet. Many people trust the
medical advice given on www.webmd.com5. Many people must trust that their banking and
credit card websites are secure. People must trust their Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to
provide secure and continuous access to the Internet. So, trust is being placed in the Internet
and its many parts in some fashion. But how is trust placed without a central regulating
authority? The issues of decentralization and trust led me to investigate social contract
theory as a way of understanding how some of these interactions and relationships exist and
flourish on the Internet.
I surmise that rules, morals, and trust exist on the Internet partly because there is an
implicit social contract on the Internet. By implicit, I mean that there is a social contract at
5
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work on the Internet, but it is not explicitly written down or governed by any one entity.
Instead, it is formed through the various interactions and relationships that are taking place
on the Internet. By understanding these interactions and relationships, patterns emerge which
reveal how this social contract is being used and what it constitutes. One example in this
implicit social contract is that it is not polite to use all capital letters when e-mailing. It
became synonomous with anger. This guidance is written down now, but it is unclear when
it actually began. How did using capital letters become the Internet equivalent to yelling in
the physical world? Along with this rule, there are others that guide people in using the
Internet. In my research, I confirmed that there are implicit social contracts at work in the
Internet through various relationships and interactions at different levels; I believe the rules
developed through these implicit social contracts. And, understanding how these rules have
formed helps show how ethical issues can be addressed on the Internet through classical
social contract theory.
As stated before, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau recognized that there were natural
laws by which humans lived. One of these laws is survival. People naturally act in their own
self-interests to survive day-to-day. This survival involved growing food, making clothes,
and building homes. But when people grouped together in larger groups, it was easier to
survive. They gave up some of the freedom they had as individuals in nature to work under a
collective set of rules that allowed them to survive more efficiently. Jobs could be separated
so that some grew food, some made clothes, and some made homes for the benefit of
everyone. These collective rules then formed into laws, and some people were tasked to
regulate these laws. In so doing, governments formed. So for a social contract to work, the
people give up some freedom and submit to governments in order for the governments to
7

serve their needs. But how is this goal accomplished on the Internet? There is no central
government in the Internet community, but people‟s needs are still being met on the Internet.
What my research uncovered is that while there is no central government in the Internet
community, the individuals of the Internet interact with each other through implicit social
contracts. There are hints of these implicit contracts in how people‟s needs are met on the
Internet.
People

are

being

entertained

daily

by

exploring

www.hulu.com

and

www.youtube.com6. People even recognize some websites as being authorities in certain
areas. Both eBay® and Amazon are respected in online shopping. For example, eBay® has
been around since 1995 and has over 84 million users worldwide (About eBay). People are
trusting Facebook and MySpace™ to share information about themselves. MySpace™ has
been around since 2003 and has thousands of users (MySpace). The sheer numbers of users
indicates that some trust is placed in these websites, otherwise they would not continue to
exist. Considering that personal information, such as age, birthplace, and interests, is being
shared shows that a good amount of trust is being given to websites and the Internet. People
are also placing trust in online banking and finances. Without a central authority, this
recognition and trust is happening without a central explicit agreement. Most websites have
a usage policy, but how did they develop without a central authority? Most of these usage
policies are even similar.

For example, the following is the opening statement from

Amazon‟s Conditions of Use:
Welcome to Amazon.com. Amazon Services LLC and/or its affiliates
("Amazon") provide website features to you subject to the following
conditions. If you visit or shop at Amazon.com, you accept these
conditions. Please read them carefully. In addition, when you use any current
6
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or future Amazon service or business (e.g., Your Profile, Gift Cards, Unbox,
or Your Media Library) you also will be subject to the guidelines, terms and
agreements ("Terms") applicable to such service or business. If these
conditions are inconsistent with such Terms, the Terms will control…
(Conditions of Use).
Now, consider the following statement from eBay®‟s Your User Agreement:
Before you may become a member of eBay, you must read and accept all of
the terms in, and linked to, this User Agreement and the eBay Privacy Policy.
We strongly recommend that, as you read this User Agreement, you also
access and read the linked information. By accepting this User Agreement,
you agree that this User Agreement and Privacy Policy will apply whenever
you use eBay sites or services, or when you use the tools we make available to
interact with eBay sites and services. If you use another eBay site, you agree
to accept the User Agreement and Privacy Policy applicable to that site. Some
eBay sites, services and tools may have additional or other terms that we
provide to you when you use those sites, services or tools. (Your User
Agreement).
The similarity in these two statements indicates that there was some agreement about what is
needed when using these websites. Considering that these are different companies, this
agreement is likely implicit; the actual situation is that both companies separately determined
that it was important for users to agree to certain usage and privacy policies to use the
websites. Both companies also determined that it was important to post these policies so that
users could find them easily. Part of this determination comes from conforming to United
States privacy laws, but the wording is also similar. In fact, usage and privacy policies are so
similar that there are privacy policy generators on the Internet. There is clearly some implicit
understanding of what these policies should contain, but how did it originate?
And, it is not just privacy policies that show similar attitudes. There is agreement
about e-mail (no all-capital letters), security (be wary of e-mail from unknown users), and

9

“twittering”7 (don‟t twitter when under the influence) (Mason).

This agreement about

etiquette, morals, etc. is implicitly agreed upon by Internet users, even if these guidelines
become explicitly written at some point. Those people that do not follow the rules are
ignored or ostracized until they conform. Websites that lose trust lose visitors. Thus far, I‟ve
shown that authority recognition and trust exist on the Internet without an ultimate central
authority. I‟ve also demonstrated that similar attitudes and guidelines exist on the Internet
without such an authority. What we are left to consider is that the similarities may have
developed through some type of implicit social contract, which I describe in this thesis,
which Internet users have developed over the years through their various interactions.
This thesis will demonstrate how this implicit social contract developed by exploring
the views of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Previous work in
investigating social contract theory for Internet governance failed to recognize that this
implicit social contract is already in place. Understanding this implicit social contract is a
first step to discovering how ethics could be practically addressed on the Internet. While I
will not fully explore this ethical problem, I show how classical social contract theory exists
on the Internet as this preliminary step to addressing the ethical and moral issues related to
Internet use. From what I know of the Internet through my experience over the last 14 years
of Internet surfing, I discovered that multiple classical social contract theories can actually be
applied to the Internet depending on which interactions and relationships are explored. In
other words, one social contract theory cannot explain the Internet completely on its own.
For this thesis, I first explain the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. In the next chapter as I explain their theories, I also highlight characteristics of

7
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their theories that help in understanding the Internet. In my third chapter, I apply these
characteristics to the Internet and show how these social contract theories have developed on
the Internet. Part of my research in this area involved conducting field investigations on
specific Internet practices to better understand how social contract theory is present on the
Internet. I also address the physical infrastructure of the Internet that was not explored fully
in previous work in this area, but that is essential to understanding social contract theory on
the Internet. In my conclusion, I show how this new understanding of the Internet through
the lens of classical social contract theory can aid in exploring ethical issues on the Internet.

activities through short messages.

11

Chapter 2-The Social Contract Theory Through the Ages
It is important to first understand classical social contract theory to understand how it
applies to the Internet. In this chapter, I first discuss Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and JeanJacques Rousseau separately to illustrate their individual approaches to social contract
theory. As I perform this explanation, I will draw attention to key points of their theories that
will aid in better understanding the Internet. I then describe the parallel concepts from each
of their theories that I apply to how the Internet is used and implicitly governed. First, I
discuss Hobbes and his theory.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is the father of modern social contract theory. His
seminal work Leviathan (1651) is just that: an immense tome of political theory. In his
work, Hobbes laid out how an individual human in the state of nature develops society to
improve survival. The society eventually culminates in the Leviathan, a sovereign who holds
ultimate authority over all people in the society. In his time, Hobbes was greatly criticized
for his points of view; for example, he was criticized by Sir Robert Filmer and the Church.
And to this day, Hobbes‟s ideas are still hotly debated. But the ideas of natural laws, natural
rights, and the social contract that Hobbes developed served to influence other political
theorists, such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau; and, these ideas formed important
foundations in political theory that continue to influence society in the present.
According to Hobbes, anarchy was worse than despotism.

This view, which is

apparent in his social contract theory, was certainly influenced by events in his life. Hobbes
was educated at Oxford and became a tutor for an aristocratic family; he became deeply
involved in the English Civil War because of his connections in the aristocratic circles and
political writings supporting monarchical authority. He left for France in 1640 for his safety
12

due to the civil unrest towards the monarchy. It is in France that he wrote Leviathan and first
proposed that men must be kept in check through a sovereign. He desired to explain how
society breaks down and what it would take to prevent such a breakdown. Although he
presented a solution to utter chaos, his book was not well-received. The French were
offended by his views on Catholicism, so Hobbes fled back to England. The English
Parliament incredulously blamed Leviathan for the Plague of 1665 and the Great Fire of
1666. Hobbes also had religious critics who saw his materialist philosophy and attacks
against religion as blasphemous (Hobbes xi-xvi). As Jennifer J. Popiel stated, “The theory of
government in Leviathan used as its basis not divine right, or the idea that the absolute head
of state was put into place by God, but the idea of a social contract” (Hobbes xiv). Even
though many of his ideas generated controversy in his time and after his death, he still
proposed important fundamentals that served as the basis for many political theories.
First, to understand Hobbes‟s social contract theory, it is important to understand
man‟s natural state as Hobbes understood it. For Hobbes, it is from this natural state that
man will first form, then join society. And, it is in this society that Hobbes‟s Leviathan will
take shape. According to Hobbes:
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that
though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of
quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference
between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon
claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.
For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the
strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are
in the same danger with himselfe. (Hobbes 75).
In this statement from Hobbes, we see several important points. First, he has stated that all
men are equal in abilities, both physically and mentally, in nature. What Hobbes means is
13

that even if there are smarter and stronger people, the differences among people are not so
great that a person cannot compensate for them. This statement also means no one is born
with rights over another person because everyone has equal abilities.

This quote also

introduces the reader to the idea of natural rights: the rights that every person is given simply
by living. Another important point seen in this passage is the idea that people can band
together to increase their power. In this statement, we see the first beginnings of society as
Hobbes described. People form society to increase their strength and power in managing and
preserving their lives. But, there is still more to explore in Hobbes‟s state of nature. Hobbes
stated:
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our
Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to
their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their
delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from
hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an
other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient
Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to
dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his
life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to
secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to
master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great
enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation
requireth, and is generally allowed. (Hobbes 76).
First, we see more of the natural rights that Hobbes has defined. Besides everyone having
equality of mind and body, everyone also has equal right to the goods in nature, such as
water and land. They also have the right to labor for goods. It is also in this passage that we
first see how Hobbes‟s state of nature differs from those of his successors, Locke and
Rousseau. He has described that since all people have equal abilities in nature, they all have
the same opportunity and ability to reach their ends. But if two people want to enjoy the
14

same end and cannot both enjoy it, they will fight against each other as enemies. Having the
power to subdue or destroy another person may require that people band together to unite
their individual powers and abilities into something greater. But, it is also possible that some
people will exercise their ability in anticipating to prevent future attacks. This idea of
anticipation is important in Hobbes‟s state of nature, so it deserves further explanation.
For Hobbes, since all men had the same capabilities and were competing for the same
limited resources, it was reasonable that some people would join together to increase their
strength against others. But, it was also reasonable that people would anticipate that others
would act against them. If so, it was within their natural rights to attack preemptively. So,
the state of nature becomes a real-life chess match where everyone acts to achieve their ends
and defends or attacks to prevent others from taking the resources for which they have
worked. This state of nature is what led Hobbes to state, “Hereby it is manifest, that during
the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that
condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man”
(Hobbes 77). As Gregory S. Kavka stated, “…the real conclusion that Hobbes draws…is
that the state of nature is a state of war of all against all, punctuated by frequent violence, in
which the participants correctly perceive themselves to be in constant danger”

(Kavka 2).

In other words, because of the real-life chess match among people, the state of nature
becomes a perpetual state of war.

It is important to realize that this is how Hobbes saw

nature to understand why he developed his ideas for society the way he did; he favored
strong government to control the chaos he saw in the state of nature. This point is not
without its critics though.

Kavka describes Hobbes‟s conclusions succinctly in the

following:
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…Hobbes constructs an elegant and insightful argument for the state of nature
being a state of war. Imagine people in a state of nature, in which there is no
common power over them to punish them for robbing, assaulting, and killing
one another. As forward-looking creatures vulnerable to death at the hands of
virtually any of their fellows, they will rightly be quite concerned about their
future security. Lacking a system of law enforcement, they cannot expect
potential attackers to be effectively deterred by fear of counterviolence. For
due to the rough equality of people‟s natural powers, and the advantages of
striking first, potential attackers will realize that they have a good chance of
success…Nor can one expect potential attackers—whose altruism is, at most,
limited—to refrain from attack out of concern for their potential victims.
Thus, each person in the state of nature must fear violence by others who may
attack for any of three reasons…First, glory seekers may attack simply
because they enjoy conquest. Second, competitors may attack to remove one
as an obstacle to the satisfaction of their desires. Third, and most important,
even “moderate” people, who have no desire for power or glory for its own
sake and who may have no specific quarrels with one, may, for defensive
purposes, engage in anticipatory violence against one…That is, they may
attack to remove one as a potential future threat to themselves, or to conquer
one to use one‟s power to deter or defend against future attacks by others. In
these circumstances, eventual involvement in violent conflict is not unlikely.
And since anticipation generally improves one‟s chances of success, it is the
most reasonable course of action for rational persons caring about their future
well-being (and caring much less, if at all, about the well-being of others) to
follow. (Kavka 3-4).
So, the state of nature becomes a state of war because people will commit violence because
they choose to, they need to for achieving their ends, or they need to commit violence against
possible future threats. From this description of the state of nature as a state of war, which
seems reasonable when presented, Hobbes concludes that people have three choices left to
them: stay in the state of nature, form a government with limited power and authority, or
form a commonwealth under a sovereign of unlimited power and authority (Kavka 4). Of
these choices, Hobbes concluded that the second choice will not allow people to leave the
state of nature because if power is simply limited, the government itself will dissolve because
it does not have enough power to control the various groups that people will form to meet
their own ends as they would in the state of nature. So, people are left with the sovereign
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being the only solution to leaving the state of nature. The sovereign, with unlimited power
and authority, is the only authority that can control the people and take them out of the state
of nature. This insight from Hobbes is important to understand in the context of the Internet
because as I explained earlier the Internet is a community of individuals and there is no
central authority over the entire Internet; the Internet is then similar to the state of nature that
Hobbes described.
Before moving on to the sovereign‟s powers and authority, it is important to realize
that the reason that Hobbes believes an absolute sovereign is the solution, even with the
threat of tyranny and despotism, is that he sees the state of nature as a perpetual state of war.
A tyrannical sovereign, even the worst kind of dictator, is not as bad as the anarchy that
results in the perpetual state of war. But, this view of humanity is very bleak. It was stated
that “…other secular philosophers who were supportive of constitutional monarchies, such as
John Locke, took issue with what they saw as Hobbes‟ [sic] pessimism about human nature
and corresponding willingness to take away personal freedom and choice” (Hobbes xv). As
Kavka states about Hobbes‟s argument, “…it overlooks the possibility of rational present
cooperation based on the expectation of future cooperation…” (Kavka 18). In other words,
Hobbes‟s main argument for proposing that people form a society in which power is given
over to a sovereign is flawed in the sense that he views humans as only capable of living in a
perpetual state of war. He denies the possibility that people can work together in the present
so that their future is better assured. Instead, Hobbes determined that the most reasonable
choice for humans was to act out of anticipation of future attacks or to attack preemptively to
gain the upper hand. The irony is that if Hobbes is so pessimistic about human nature, it is
more likely that his sovereign will be a tyrant. But as Hobbes understood the situation, no
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tyrant was worse than the state of nature. Hobbes‟s state of nature is important to understand
because of the following: 1) Locke and Rousseau have differing views of the state of nature;
and 2) it is through understanding these various views of the state of nature that the state of
nature of the Internet can first be explored. At this point though, we can understand that
Hobbes, because of his particular view of the state of nature, may have viewed the Internet
community as composed of self-interested people with equal capabilities who strive to
survive through mistrust of their fellow Internet users.
With Hobbes‟s state of nature and his argument for people forming a government
controlled by an ultimate sovereign developing, it is now time to examine Hobbes‟s
sovereign and its powers.

First, it is important to understand how Hobbes viewed the

sovereign and his limits and why a tyrant is possible in Hobbes‟s theory. Hobbes stated the
following:
Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Soveraign
Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For it has been
already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a
Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury;
because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he
never wanteth Right to anything, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject
of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. (Hobbes 135).
So according to Hobbes, we see that the sovereign has no limits on his powers. The
sovereign has power over life and death. And, since the sovereign is empowered by the
subjects, which will be explained further, the sovereign can do no wrong. In fact, Hobbes
explicitly stated that the sovereign‟s actions cannot be accused of injustice or punished by his
subjects when he stated that “…whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his
Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice…and consequently to that
which was sayd last, no man that hath Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or
18

otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished” (Hobbes 111). From these short excerpts
from Leviathan, we see that Hobbes views the sovereign‟s powers as absolute. However, he
does contradict himself somewhat. Hobbes stated:
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long,
and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For
the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can
protect them, can by no Convenant be relinquished. (Hobbes 140).
What Hobbes means in this statement is that subjects only need to obey the sovereign as long
as the sovereign can protect them. For example if a country is invaded and the sovereign is
not able to protect the subjects, the subjects are under no obligation to obey the sovereign.
Hobbes‟s reasoning for this point, from the second part of the statement, is that all people
have in the state of nature the right to protect themselves and no agreement or contract can
take that right away. So if the sovereign cannot protect the subjects, the subjects are free to
take their protection into their own hands and break their contract with the government.
But from this statement, we can also infer that the sovereign should not have the
power to kill subjects without cause. If the sovereign is killing subjects indiscriminately,
then he is no longer protecting the subjects. This situation would free the subjects to assume
their own protection. Killing subjects indiscriminately is not a power the sovereign can have,
so we now see a limit to Hobbes‟s sovereign. From this exploration, it is now understood
that Hobbes‟s sovereign has unlimited powers except when the sovereign can no longer
protect the people or is directly sacrificing subjects for no cause. In other words, it is
permissible for the sovereign to send people to war where they may die or execute criminals
because these actions aid in protecting the subjects as a whole. As Hobbes stated:
And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them
all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of
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Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge
both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and
disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be
done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by
prevention of Discord at home, and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace
and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. (Hobbes 112).
But if the sovereign is killing subjects and this killing is not for the benefit of the community,
then the sovereign is not fulfilling his part of the social contract and the subjects have the
right to disobey. So, Hobbes‟s sovereign has no limits on power as long as he ensures the
protection of the community. Before moving on, I want to note that an Internet equivalent
for Hobbes‟s sovereign may be the owner of a network that resides on the Internet. Or, it
could be the owner of a single computer on the Internet. Essentially, the only requirement
for an Internet sovereign, according to Hobbes, would be an individual or small group of
individuals that have absolute control over an Internet community. Of course, an ethical
issue can be mentioned at this point; an Internet sovereign can employ measures to protect a
computer or network, but should that sovereign also have the ability to attack other
computers and networks out of anticipation of future attacks? This situation may arise as
Hobbes understood the state of nature, but the Internet does not have to be a state of war.
With these points understood, it is time to explore how Hobbes‟s sovereign originally
receives its power from the community.
At this point, Hobbes has shown that all people are born equal in the sense that
everyone is endowed with the same physical and mental capabilities. There are differences
among people, but Hobbes‟s conjecture is that there are no differences that cannot be
overcome. Since everyone is equal, each person is capable of pursuing his desires. These
desires include basic survival, property, etc. But for Hobbes, the main characteristic of this
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natural state is that there is no power that keeps people in check. Each person is also free and
capable to pursue whatever means in pursuing his desires. As Hobbes stated:
And because the condition of Man…is a condition of Warre of everyone
against everyone; in which case everyone is governed by his own Reason; and
there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in
preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition,
every man has a Right to everything; even to one anothers body. And
therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to everything endureth,
there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of
living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. (Hobbes
79-80).
For Hobbes, this situation means that people will use violence to reach their ends simply
because they can. As there is no power to keep people in check, violence will also go
unchecked. Violence will result from simple desire, eliminating obstacles, or eliminating
future threats to one‟s safety or advancement. This state of nature, as stated before, is a state
of war which leads to the conclusion that the only way to leave the state of nature, or war, is
to institute a governing body that has the power to keep people in check. But, where does
this governing body get its power?

It receives it from the individuals in the society.

According to Hobbes:
If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently,
but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of
Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is
Voyd: But if there be a common Power set over them both, with right and
force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that
performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the
bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and
other Passions, without the feare of some coërceive Power; which in the
condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the
justnesse of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therfore he
which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the
Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.
But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that
would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for
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that cause, he which by the Convenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.
(Hobbes 84).
As Hobbes pointed out, there is no power in nature to compel anyone to do anything. So if
two men come to an agreement, but one man realizes that he can do better for himself by
breaking that agreement, there is no power that will prevent him from breaking that
agreement. But if men and women are formed in a civil state, or commonwealth, there is a
power that can compel everyone to honor agreements and work towards the common good.
Even though the first man who agrees to the social contract is at a disadvantage, since all
others can simply ignore the social contract, he should be obliged to agree to the social
contract because it will be the only way to set up a civil state that will supremely benefit
everyone and take everyone out of the state of war. For Hobbes, the commonwealth is the
only guaranteed way out of the state of nature because it guarantees security so everyone can
act without violence since it is no longer needed. As Hobbes stated:
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and
Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves,
(in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own
preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting
themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily
consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there
is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment
to the performance of their Covenants… (Hobbes 105).
In other words, the entire purpose of a commonwealth is to ensure everyone‟s preservation
by keeping everyone‟s natural passions in check. And by ensuring everyone‟s preservation,
Hobbes conjectures that a commonwealth will allow people to live a better life.
This commonwealth will derive its power from the people that form the social
contract. Hobbes stated:
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The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend
them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and
thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the
fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to
conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of
men, that may reduce all their Wills…and therein to submit their Wills,
everyone to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more
than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same
Person, made by Convenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as
if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of
Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition,
that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like
manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a
COMMON-WEALTH…This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or
rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe
under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. (Hobbes 107-108).
In this passage, we see Hobbes‟s ultimate end.

The men and women who form the

commonwealth collectively give up their right to govern themselves to either one person, or
an assembly of persons. In giving up their right to govern themselves, they also agree to
submit to the governing body‟s will and judgment. But, an interesting aspect of Hobbes is
that he sees the governing body as the equivalent of a living god. It is statements like these
that brought Hobbes in opposition to religion; but the reason he made this statement is
because he stressed that in order for the commonwealth to succeed, the people had to submit
wholly to the government. In other words, the people had to look to the Leviathan, the
sovereign, as a person, or assembly, with ultimate power and authority. Another important
point to understand is that the sovereign is empowered by the people who agree to form the
social contract. In other words, the people establish this contract to empower a sovereign
that takes them out of the state of nature. This empowering is a conscious decision, but as I
pointed out earlier the Internet is formed from an implicit social contract. For Hobbes's
sovereign to appear on the Internet, I will show how a community of Internet users can
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empower a single entity or small group of entities as a sovereign, even without an explicit
agreement.
But, Hobbes‟s argument for a sovereign does have some shortcomings besides
allowing for despotic tyrants. Jean Hampton identified the following:
So, we now see that Hobbes‟s social contract argument is invalid: That
argument cannot show that people, as he has described them, can institute
what Hobbes defines as an absolute sovereign. Indeed, let us spell out this
invalidity precisely:
1. In order for peace to be secured, an absolute sovereign must be created,
and an absolute sovereign is defined as one who is master of all his
subject-slaves; this absolute sovereign is the final decider of all questions
in the commonwealth, including the question whether or not he will
continue to hold power, and in virtue of deciding this last question, he
holds power permanently.
2. Hobbesian people empower a ruler by obeying his punishment commands,
and they do so whenever they decide such obedience is conducive to their
best interests.
3. But from (2), it follows that the ruler created by Hobbesian people does
not decide all questions; in particular, he does not decide for his subjects
the question whether or not they will obey his commands—including his
punishment commands.
4. It follows from (3) that insofar as a ruler holds power only as long as his
subjects obey his punishment commands, the subjects determine (by their
decision whether or not to obey these commands) whether or not he will
continue to hold power.
5. Hence, from (3) and (4), Hobbesian people cannot create a ruler who
meets the definition of a sovereign in (1) (i.e., a ruler who decides all
questions in the commonwealth and whose reign is permanent), which,
from (1), means that they cannot secure peace. (Hampton 54-55).

Essentially, what Jean Hampton has illustrated is that there can be no absolute sovereign who
decides all answers in the community because the sovereign cannot force the people to
initially place him in power. In other words, the sovereign cannot place himself in power
which means that the sovereign is not absolute. Additionally, the sovereign cannot decide to
keep himself in power either. So, the essential flaw in Hobbes‟s argument is that either it
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does not fit with how he defines a sovereign or the social contract that grants Hobbes‟s
sovereign power is not a true social contract. This ambiguity is not surprising as Hobbes
creates paradoxes in his theories, such as the one explored above concerning the sovereign‟s
limits. According to Richard Tuck:
The common impression of Hobbes is of a theorist of absolute state power, an
impression fostered by the very title of Leviathan…But there are some
important qualifications to be introduced, which derive from Hobbes‟s
conception of the fundamental character of sovereign power…In Leviathan, at
least, he frequently talks about the sovereign acting in some sense on behalf of
his citizens, and seems to regard it as rational for a sovereign to do whatever
he sincerely believes conduces to his own preservation and that of the people
he represents. For the sovereign to do anything else, he repeatedly says…
would be „a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature‟--though, as we shall
see, he did not conclude from the fact that a sovereign might have no right to
do something, that a subject might have the right to resist him. (Tuck 80-81).
In short, Hobbes‟s sovereign is not really as absolute as it seems according to how Hobbes
describes the sovereign; Hobbes‟s sovereign has at least moral limits. Some of these moral
limits result from the sovereign having to act to preserve the citizens in the same way he
would preserve himself. For example, war may be necessary to preserve the safety of the
community even though some of the citizens may perish in the war. This action would be
just and proper, but simply exterminating citizens for no reason would not be a right action,
as was addressed earlier. And, the sovereign should not act this way because it would be
equivalent to exterminating himself. So even though Hobbes proposes that the citizens
submit completely to the will of the sovereign, he does not actually make the sovereign allpowerful. Hobbes‟s sovereign must protect the citizens or risk their disobedience.
Hobbes explores other concepts in Leviathan to flesh out his social contract theory.
For example, he explored the nature of succession of the sovereign power. Hobbes stated
that “...either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession, or else that right
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is again in the dissolved Multitude” (Hobbes 123).

Much of Hobbes‟s theory is only

understood after first exploring his state of nature and his idea of the sovereign as his other
ideas derive from these important points.

The ideas of natural rights and forming a

government through consent are among the most important contributions Hobbes made to
political theory. These ideas would later influence Locke and Rousseau, as I will show, even
though they used them differently in their ends of government. It is also important to
understand that much of the power that Hobbes invests in the sovereign is due to his
pessimistic view of human nature. Because he felt humans on their own in the state of nature
were brutal and self-serving, he felt that a sovereign with ultimate power and authority was
necessary to control and guide humanity. He also felt that society must be united in a single
cause, so he was critical about anything that may seek to divide society. Factions could
result in conflict that would divide society against itself. But even though Hobbes had such a
negative view of humanity, he still made important contributions to political theories that
continue to influence society today. Before addressing Locke, I want to point out that in
applying Hobbes‟s social contract theory to the Internet, again, we must realize that he would
see Internet users as being in a state of war. In other words, Internet users will act to better
their conditions on the Internet even at the expense of other Internet users. This situation will
result in Internet users not trusting each other.
With Hobbes‟s social contract theory in hand, for the purposes of this thesis, the next
important philosopher in social contract theory to understand is John Locke. Locke (16321704) was one of the most influential political philosophers for Western politics. In The
Second Treatise of Government (1690), Locke laid out his idea of a social contract. An
interesting note is that Locke‟s ideas were just as influential during his time as they are now.
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Consider the idea of natural rights. Today, we take for granted that humans are born with
certain rights that are not due to any law or government. Many of us remember Thomas
Jefferson‟s famous words from the Declaration of Independence (1776):
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. (Wilson 15).
This idea of natural rights began with Hobbes in Leviathan, but Locke further examined
these rights and natural law; and, it is almost certain that Jefferson was influenced by Locke‟s
ideas. Another of Locke‟s main ideas is that government can only rule with the consent of
the governed. It is likely Jefferson was again influenced by Locke:
That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed. (Wilson 15).
While today these ideas do not seem new or revolutionary, it is due partly to Locke that these
ideas and others became so influential in our time.
Before examining Locke‟s ideas in detail, it is first important to understand the
historical context in which he developed them.

While Locke was writing his Second

Treatise, the English monarchy was instituting conditions similar to those that led to the civil
war in the 1640s that ended with Charles I being executed in 1649 (Locke ST viii). During
Locke‟s writing the monarchy had only been restored for 20 years, but was attempting to
have absolute control over both the people and the Parliament. Locke was drawn into
politics through his employer, the Earl of Shaftesbury. Due to his participation in the various
political organizations opposing the monarchy, Locke was certainly influenced to write
against monarchies and justify that power be kept with the people and Parliament. As his
ideas are shown to develop in his treatise, it is important to understand this context. During
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the primary writing of his treatises, Locke wrote in exile from England fearing arrest. The
political movement in which Locke was involved, which was formed over distaste with the
monarchy, caused the Glorious Revolution (1688-1689). James II was removed and replaced
by William and Mary (Locke ST viii). As Locke‟s Two Treatises of Government were
published in 1690 anonymously, it has been conjectured that part of the purpose of the
treatises was to explain and justify why the revolution was necessary (Locke ST ix). This
point is important to note because whether it is true or not, it is at least true that Locke‟s ideas
were influenced by events during his life. And, it is certainly possible that his writing and his
participation also helped influence those events in turn. With this historical background in
mind, Locke‟s ideas are more clearly understood.
Locke begins his Second Treatise with a short essay on civil government in which he
started to define true political power. The first step in his argument is to attack the idea
perpetuated by Sir Robert Filmer and others of the time that the monarchy has the right to
rule because they are descendants of Adam, the first man. Locke‟s first statement is “Firstly.
That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God,
any such authority over his children, nor dominion over the world, as is pretended” (Locke
ST 1). Locke also states that even if Adam had such power, it does not mean his heirs were
entitled to it. He goes on to point out that there are also no natural laws that determine proper
succession of power in all instances, and that the time of Adam is so long ago that no one
race could claim to be his descendants and heirs. This first point is important to Locke
because as stated before, there was a souring towards the monarchy. But, this first step also
allowed for Locke to now show what he believed to be true political power in government
because he pointed out that what the monarchy claimed as their source of power was not true.
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With Locke having pointed out that neither Adam nor his descendants had political
power and that nature did not provide for any succession of power, Locke then defines his
version of the state of nature and why it is important for his argument. According to Locke:
To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must
consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect
freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or
depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal,
no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that
creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same
advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal
one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and
master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one
above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an
undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. (Locke ST 3).
With these first statements, Locke has explained that in the state of nature all persons are
equal, no one person has more power than any other, and any person is free to do whatever
he wants within the bounds of the law of nature. For example a person is free to walk
anywhere he desires, but can only walk there as fast as he is capable and only as long as he
has the energy to do so. If the person does want to continue walking, at certain points he will
have to eat, rest, etc. in order to continue. This situation results from nature having put
certain limits on our capabilities. People need air, water, food, and rest to survive. They can
do whatever they want as long as they meet their needs. For most people, and Locke, the fact
that we are given a life with these basic needs and the capabilities to fulfill them is proof that
we do have natural rights. For Locke these natural rights are the beginning of political
power, and everyone starts with the same amount of power. A. John Simmons points out,
“…in Locke the primary point of the state of nature is not to reveal human nature in any of
its particular guises, it is rather to describe a certain moral condition of men” (Simmons LSN
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113). As pointed out before this moral condition is that people are free to do what they want,
but they have natural limitations and needs. In other words there are no limits on a person‟s
desires, but there are limits on a person‟s capabilities in fulfilling those desires. With no
limits on desires, the moral condition is that a person‟s fulfillment of his desires is only
limited by his capabilities in acting on those desires. The other part of the moral condition
though is that since everyone is at the same level, there will be interaction among people to
compete for resources to satisfy their needs and protect their lives so they can either
cooperate or compete against each other.
The state of nature, as with Hobbes‟s social contract theory, is central to
understanding Locke‟s political philosophy so this concept requires more discussion. First
since every person is born alive, it is reasonable to conclude that everyone has the right to
continue living as long as nature allows. In other words, any person is free to meet whatever
needs require him to survive until such time that he dies naturally or through some
unforeseen circumstance. With that in mind, every person requires air, water, food, and rest
to survive. A person can simply breathe for air, but the person needs to labor to obtain water
and food. The person may have to look for water, dig for water, gather food, grow food,
make food, etc. Rest is also required after a certain amount of labor so that the person can
continue to labor later on. Nature is an important judge in this condition. People can only
use a certain amount of food in a certain amount of time. If the person does not get enough
food, his survival is affected. If the person takes too much food, the food may spoil. Thus, it
is wasted and useless to any person; this waste goes against nature. The concept of property
becomes important here as well. According to Locke, “We see in commons, which remain
so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the
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state Nature leaves it in, which begins the property, without which the common is of no
use…The labor that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath
fixed my property in them” (Locke ST 17). In other words, everything in nature is available
for everyone‟s use. But when a person gathers food or water, it becomes his property for his
use solely because he performed the labor for that gathering. I will further address Locke‟s
notion of property because it is another important component of Locke‟s social contract
theory; property also becomes important when discussing the Internet because Internet users
have both physical property, such as computers, and virtual property, such as e-mail. It is
also important to further explore Locke‟s state of nature because it contrasts with Hobbes‟s
state of nature.
As pointed out earlier, everyone is born with the same right to survival and nature
provides limits that everyone must surpass to survive. However, after survival, everyone is
free to do whatever they want simply because nature provides no limits to desire. As Locke
pointed out, this is “…perfect freedom…” (Locke ST 3). To put things simply, let us
describe two people with different desires. One person desires to be a vegetarian. This
person has the freedom to be a vegetarian, but must still work within the limits of nature to
survive. For example even though the person chooses not to eat meat, the person must still
eat to survive. The second person desires to be a meat-eater. This person also has the
freedom to be a meat-eater, but must still work within the limits of nature to survive which
includes laboring to hunt animals for food or raising animals for food. Now, consider that a
person desires to simply profit from the labor of others to survive by possibly stealing food.
This person still has freedom of desire and is still working within the limits of nature to
survive. The only difference is that now this person intends to exploit others to survive.
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Locke has a response to this situation, which he describes as the state of war. In describing
the state of nature Locke stated, “But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of
licence; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or
possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his
possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it…And, being
furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of Nature, there cannot be
supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one another, as
if we were made for one another‟s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours” (Locke
ST 4). Simply put while those inferior to humans, such as animals, can be made use of for
food or clothing, it is not natural for any human to exploit another human because all humans
were given the same abilities and qualities to live in nature. And, any human who seeks to
exploit others “…declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common
equity…” (Locke ST 5). The state of war is when a human being decides not to live
according to nature, and this situation is what leads Locke into his argument for civil
government. But before addressing Locke‟s form of government, it is important to note how
Locke‟s state of nature is both similar and dissimilar to Hobbes‟s state of nature. Locke
agreed with Hobbes that there is equality in nature and that people have the natural right to
survive, but Locke did not see the state of nature as a perpetual state of war as did Hobbes.
Instead, Locke saw the state of war as resulting when people denied the natural rights of
others.

Locke did not see that the state of war was perpetual because humans were

constantly seeking to undermine each other. So in terms of the Internet, Locke would not see
Internet users as constantly at odds with each other as Hobbes would.
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Locke would

recognize that there could be mutual cooperation between Internet users, as shown in further
exploring Locke‟s theory.
First, consider that Locke established that all humans have the right to survive.
Second, according to Locke, it is fine to hunt animals because they do not have the same
abilities as humans to live in nature. Third, Locke has established that someone who seeks to
exploit other humans has decided to live outside of Nature‟s laws. It is reasonable to
conclude then that a person has the right to defend himself against a person who seeks to
exploit him. And, this is exactly what Locke determined when he stated, “To be free from
such force is the only security of my preservation, and reason bids me look on him as an
enemy to my preservation who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it…”
(Locke ST 11). Locke also stated, “Men living together according to reason without a
common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of
Nature” (Locke ST 11). This point is another important contribution of Locke; men in the
state of nature have the ability and authority to judge transgressions against nature. If a
person threatens another person, that person has the right to judge and punish the
transgression. As Locke stated:
And thus it is that every man in the state of Nature has a power to kill a
murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury (which no reparation
can compensate) by the example of the punishment that attends it from
everybody, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal who,
having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to
mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon
one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a
lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no
society nor security. And upon this is grounded that great law of Nature,
“Whoso sheddeth man‟s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.” (Locke ST
7).
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Now it is understood that a human can kill to preserve his life, but also to prevent someone
from taking it. And when killing is justified, it is because the person who is killed has
stepped out of nature and become like an animal.
So if men have the freedom and power to take care of themselves, why would they
consent to give power over to another like a government? Simply put, it is easier for men
and women of like minds to pull their resources and properties together in common survival
and defense. And, men can reason to improve their condition in life. As Locke stated in An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “…it is the understanding that sets man above the
rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over
them…” (Locke HU xxxv). So, Locke reasoned that men could form communities in order
to live and protect their labor and property better. For example, let us consider a community
of just two individuals. It is up to each individual to survive and live as they desire. But
perhaps one is better skilled at hunting, and the other is better skilled at growing vegetables.
They could choose to work together. One will do the hunting for the both of them; and the
other will grow enough vegetables for the both of them. The other advantage is that two
people have a better chance at defending themselves against a single outsider who threatens
their survival and property than either of the people on his own. It is from simple beginnings
such as this that political communities start. As Locke stated, “Men being, as has been said,
by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected
to the political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with
other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable
living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security
against any that are not of it…For, when any number of men have, by the consent of every
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individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a
power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority”
(Locke ST 52).

In this statement, we begin to understand why consent is of absolute

importance to Locke. We have established how he showed that men are free to fulfill their
desires. Their only limits are what they need to do to survive in order to live to fulfill their
desires. It is clear that all men have this same charge, and it is also clear that men have the
power to judge transgressions against them and their property in the interest of survival and
their own freedom. Additionally, others may judge against these men in this community. So
even though men benefit from joining a community because survival is easier and more
secure, joining the community must be completely voluntary because in gaining those
benefits they give up their power of judgment against transgressions to the community and
open themselves for judgments against them. This is further illustrated by Locke when he
stated:
The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to
which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting…Firstly, there
wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common
consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to
decide all controversies between them…Secondly, in the state of Nature there
wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all
differences according to the established law…Thirdly, in the state of Nature
there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to
give it due execution. (Locke ST 67-68).
As Locke points out, the benefits of men joining into political communities is that they gain a
standard and common law. In the state of nature, there is no common law besides survival
for men to follow. Aside from that basic need and all it entails, men simply follow their
personal desires. Not all men have the same desires, so there are possibilities for problems
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and conflicts between men. There are no impartial judges in nature; there is no natural
objective authority that governs men. Even if there was a common law, there is the risk of
men judging transgressions with a bias. Perhaps for some men, they would judge harshly for
the smallest transgressions out of their own personal desires and prejudices. Last, in nature, a
person is on his own. He may not be able to defend against another if that person is
considerably stronger, but a community has more strength in protecting all its members.
Before I address Locke‟s community, I want to again highlight the importance of Locke‟s
notion of property. As stated above, a person‟s labor in taking something out of the natural
state fixes that something as his property. And, governments are instituted to ensure that a
person‟s property is protected. In fact, preserving property becomes the chief purpose of
government.

In applying Locke‟s ideas to the Internet, this idea of property must be

addressed. And in terms of the Internet, a person can have property. There are the different
physical components of the Internet, such as routers and computers; and, there is also virtual
property in the form of information a person owns on the Internet, such as e-mail inboxes. I
will address the physical and virtual structure of the Internet later in this thesis, but for now it
is important to just understand that a person can have property on the Internet which is an
important consideration in applying Locke‟s social contract theory to the Internet. Let us
now return to Locke‟s ideas of the political community.
A community has the benefit of one common law by which everyone can abide.
Judges can be appointed to decide impartially by the common law, and the community can
have the manpower to enforce the common law and protect the community. The community
must also protect its citizens from those outside the community. As Locke points out, people
join communities by consent so it is possible for people to be in the state of nature when
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others are in communities. As Simmons so eloquently states of Locke‟s state of nature, “A is
in the state of nature with respect to B if and only if A has not voluntarily agreed to join (or is
no longer a member of) a legitimate political community of which B is a member” (Simmons
LSN 103). Locke stated this same point in that “…the whole community is one body in the
state of Nature in respect of all other states or persons out of its community” (Locke ST 81).
Again, it is important to note how Locke stresses consent because it is possible for men to not
join any communities and continue to remain in the state of nature. If men are already
supremely free in nature, then they must be willing to give up some of their freedom, such as
the power to judge transgressions and kill for survival, to a community. The power must be
given voluntarily otherwise men are not acting with the freedom that nature has given them.
Another important point is that in Locke‟s social contract theory, it is possible for an entire
political community to be in the state of nature with regards to other communities. This
point is important in the context of the Internet because, as stated earlier, the Internet is
composed of individual entities such as companies. As a company can be understood as a
community of individuals, it is then possible that this community is in the state of nature with
regards to other communities such as other companies. In the state of nature on the Internet,
we can then also see Lockean companies in the state of nature with individual Internet users.
And as I describe further in this thesis, some of these Internet users can be Hobbesian or
Lockean.
Locke believed that all men had two powers given by Nature. According to Locke,
“The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within
the permission of the law of Nature…The other power a man has in the state of Nature is the
power to punish the crimes committed against that law” (Locke ST 68-69). So when men
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give their powers to government, how should it take shape there? As stated before, Locke
was almost certainly influenced to speak against a monarchy. His reasoning, even though
Locke felt people were generally reasonable, was that power corrupts. As he stated, “For he
that thinks absolute power purifies men‟s blood, and corrects the baseness of human nature,
need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced to the contrary” (Locke ST
49). His expanded reasoning was that the power to make laws, legislative, and the power to
enforce laws, executive, was too much to reside in one man. Locke stated, “For he being
supposed to have all, both legislative and executive, power in himself alone, there is no judge
to be found, no appeal lies open to anyone, who may fairly and indifferently, and with
authority decide, and from whence relief and redress may be expected of any injury or
inconveniency that may be suffered from him, or by his order” (Locke ST 48). This point is
important because the entire benefit of government in preservation of property and safer
survival for men depends on a common law with objective judgment. It is by this reasoning
that Locke justified that a monarchy was not a proper civil government. Instead, there should
be a legislative power and an executive power. Locke further described both of these
powers. He stated:
Therefore in well-ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so
considered as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers
persons who, duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a
power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they
are themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near
tie upon them to take care that they make them for the public good.
…But because the laws that are at once, and in a short time made, have a
constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance
thereunto, therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being
which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in
force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be
separated. (Locke ST 80-81).
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So Locke‟s legislative power created a common law, then disbanded; but, his executive
power remained in force to ensure the laws were followed. Locke also identified a federative
power that represented the political community in dealing with those outside of the political
community. Locke‟s reasoning in separating the powers is not lost on us, even now. But it is
interesting to note that he felt that once laws were made, the legislative power disbanded so
all men involved lived under the same laws. It is most likely that Locke felt that when it was
time for laws to be addressed or changed, a completely new legislative was called together
and formed. The main point is that Locke felt that men and women could only make good
laws for the benefit of everyone if they knew that they would live under these laws after they
were made.
This situation brings another important consideration of Locke: what happens when
the government is no longer working for the public good? In regards to power, Locke stated
that “…nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself, and nobody has an
absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away
the life or property of another” (Locke ST 74). This idea even transfers to Locke‟s thoughts
of government. He stated that “…it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative
power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject
arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure” (Locke ST 76-77). Here is a final quote
from Locke that seals this importance of consent: “…political power is that power which
every man having in the state of Nature has given up into the hands of the society, and
therein to the governors whom the society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit trust,
that it shall be employed for their good and the preservation of their property” (Locke ST
97). While the men and women give up their power by consent, Simmons points out that this
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is not a bad thing. He stated, “Consent is an act only a free person can perform; it is a use,
not a breach, of one‟s freedom” (Simmons PC 131). So consent is a freedom that men and
women use to give a government power to work in their best interests to ensure safer survival
and preserve their property, which is the result of their individual labor. It is not surprising
then that Locke endorses dissolving the government when it no longer works for the people.
It is possible that Locke was led toward this end as a separation from Hobbes, but he reasons
this point logically. Locke stated:
The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property;
and the end while they choose and authorize a legislative is that there may be
laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the
society, to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and
member of the society. For since it can never be supposed to be the will of the
society that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which everyone
designs to secure by entering into society, and for which the people submitted
themselves to legislators of their own making: whenever the legislators
endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce
them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war
with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and
are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men against
force and violence. (Locke ST 123-124).
In other words, men and women owe no allegiance to a government they voluntarily form to
help them survive better and preserve the property they have earned when that government
no longer works for them. And as Locke stated, “…when the government is dissolved, the
people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative differing from
the other by the change of persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety
and good” (Locke ST 123). In the end, it becomes the duty of the people to erect a new
government to ensure their public good when the old government no longer meets their
needs. Again it is likely Locke was influenced by the political atmosphere of the time, but it
does not change his reasoning and justification for the social contract and the logical claims
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he made. In terms of the Internet, Locke‟s ideas on property become important; but,
Locke‟s ideas on political consent also become important because communities on the
Internet that conform to Lockean principles will form by consent. Even if these relationships
are between two parties, if the parties follow Lockean principles, voluntary consent is
important; or, the parties can dissolve the relationship.
Locke details more ideas in his Second Treatise of Government, including how
money is formed for use because it is not perishable, how slavery is justified when the slaves
are would-be conquerors that were defeated justly, and how usurpers of power are never in
the right. But, his most important and main contributions are the natural rights men and
women have and how this allows them to form governments to improve their lot. Those
governments are only formed and given power by consent; and when the government no
longer works for the public good, it is up to the people to dissolve it and erect a new
government. Additionally, the power of governments must remain separated to guard against
tyranny. These ideas are central to understanding Locke‟s social contract theory, and his
judgments during his time stemmed from these foundations which have influenced Western
politics through to the present time. And, his ideas can be applied to the Internet. I will
explain this notion further; but, at this point, I do want to call attention to Locke‟s reasoning
about the state of nature and property. As stated before, Locke‟s state of nature contrasts
with Hobbes‟s state of nature in that he did not see the state of nature as a perpetual state of
war. This situation translates to the Internet in that Locke would not see Internet users as
constantly seeking to outdo one another. In terms of property, Locke would recognize the
different ways a person could have property on the Internet: physical and virtual. And as I
also explained, Internet relationships following Lockean principles will require voluntary
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consent. I will address these points later in this thesis, but now I turn my attention to
Rousseau‟s social contract theory.
The last philosopher to discuss in classical social contract theory before further
comparing the different theories is Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau (1712-1778), known as
the founding father of the Romantic Movement, was also a significant contributor to political
thought. In The Social Contract, first published in 1762, Rousseau presents his version of
social contract theory that differs in many ways from those theories of his predecessors.
Hobbes felt that all political power should rest with an ultimate sovereign; Rousseau felt that
all political power should be maintained by the people, who he felt formed the real sovereign.
Locke felt governments were only legitimate if they were formed with the consent of the
people and that the people had the right to rebel against governments that no longer had their
consent. Rousseau felt that consent must be given not once, but repeatedly by the citizen
throughout his lifetime (Rousseau xiv). In addition to presenting his social contract theory,
Rousseau introduced the idea of the general will and popular sovereignty. Rousseau also saw
government as the opportunity for people to improve morally and admired ancient societies,
such as Sparta, for their community-first views (Rousseau xv).

Before expanding on

Rousseau‟s social contract theory, let us first examine the historical context of the time in
which Rousseau wrote.
Unlike Locke, Rousseau was actually famous and recognized in France during his
time. He was a best-selling author before the French Revolution, and he even was asked to
work on the constitutions for Corsica and Poland (Rousseau x-xi). He wrote on various
subjects, including art and science. His career was not without controversy though. In The
Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, Rousseau wrote how art, music, and drama can distract
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the people from problems in a corrupt society (Rousseau x).

His novel Emile was

condemned by the Parisian parliament in 1762 (Rousseau xi). At a time where Europe was
known for large monarchical states, Rousseau was proposing that the proper community of
people was a city-state. This fact is not completely surprising when you know that Rousseau
was born in Geneva, which was one of the last free states in Europe (Rousseau x-xii). It is
also not surprising that Rousseau‟s ideas and The Social Contract were embraced during the
French Revolution. In a time where wealth and aristocracy ruled, people were eager to
embrace a philosophy that proposed that people should have all the power in ruling. But,
Rousseau also embraced a higher philosophy where “…the common good takes precedence
over individual preference” (Rousseau xv). In the revolutionary ideas of popular sovereignty
and the general will that Rousseau proposes, it is easy to lose sight that Rousseau was also
proposing that the ideal government would also help people to improve morally. With this
beginning background, let us explore Rousseau‟s social contract.
In the introduction, Rousseau states:
I mean to inquire if, in the civil order, there can be any sure and legitimate
rule of administration, men being taken as they are and laws as they might be.
In this inquiry I shall endeavor always to unite what right sanctions with what
is prescribed by interest, in order that justice and utility may in no case be
divided.
I enter upon my task without proving the importance of the subject. I shall
be asked if I am a prince or a legislator, to write on politics. I answer that I
am neither, and that is why I do so. If I were a prince or a legislator, I should
not waste time in saying what wants doing; I should do it, or hold my peace.
As I was a born a citizen of a free State, and a member of the Sovereign, I
feel that, however feeble the influence my voice can have on public affairs,
the right of voting on them makes it my duty to study them: and I am happy,
when I reflect upon governments, to find my inquiries always furnish me with
new reasons for loving that of my own country. (Rousseau 1).

43

The first insight we receive from Rousseau is that he will link what is right with what is
desired. In other words, Rousseau wants to achieve a moral condition where wanting to do
doing what is right is the primary interest. This point is important as it begins to show us that
his highest goal for government is that it helps the people develop morally. The next insight
is in Rousseau‟s statement about entering the task without proving its importance. The first
point is that Rousseau is demonstrating that just by being a citizen of the community, he has
the right to critique politics. He expands on this point when he later states that his right to
vote, no matter how small his influence, makes it his duty to study public affairs. The other
point about Rousseau not justifying his task is as a statement against Hobbes. In Leviathan,
Hobbes spends the first part of the book justifying not only his right to speak, but his right to
be heard. When Rousseau immediately moved into his discussion of politics, he sent a clear
message that his very living already justified his right to discuss politics. Another point that
is made by Rousseau is the charge against the monarchy. Simply put, he stated that the
responsibility of the government is to simply do what is right. Government should not be
writing, but doing. The interesting aspect of this point is that it is generally distasteful for
people to think about not knowing what the government is doing. People expect to know
about laws that are in effect, if the government is declaring war on another nation, and who is
being elected, for example. So, why does Rousseau charge government to simply act? We
get a hint of this answer when Rousseau refers to himself as a member of the sovereign. He
was not born to monarchy, and he states that he is not a prince or legislator. This statement is
understood after reading further, but the answer is that the people are the sovereign.
Rousseau is a member of the sovereign because he is a citizen of the community. The
sovereign, or the true governing power, is the people. And if the people are doing what is
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right, they know what is being done.

This reason is why Rousseau can charge that

government‟s duty is to simply do what needs to be done while still allowing that the people
will know what the government is doing. A final point on this introduction is that to fully
understand it, you need to know Rousseau‟s theory. In other words, you need to know the
end to understand the beginning. This “circular” reasoning is seen more in The Social
Contract, as we will see.
Rousseau begins the first of his four books of The Social Contract with the following,
“Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains” (Rousseau 2). Rousseau then goes on to
say that he will attempt to determine what makes the chains legitimate.

Like Locke,

Rousseau agrees that there must be justification for the chains since they do not exist in
nature. Rousseau states, “…the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other
rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on
conventions. Before coming to that, I have to prove what I have just asserted” (Rousseau 2).
I want to make note of this point because Rousseau is clearly showing that the social contract
is not a natural contract, but one that is constructed by humans in order to better their
condition in life. This conclusion is also what Hobbes and Locke identified when they
recognized that humans must form a social contract to empower a government that would
remove them from the state of nature and improve their lives. For Hobbes, the government
would keep order. For Locke, the government would ensure that private property was
preserved. In terms of the Internet there is a unique opportunity to apply social contract
theory because like the social contract itself, the Internet is an artificially created
environment.

With this start in identifying that social order does not naturally occur,

Rousseau goes on to describe the beginnings of society. He states:
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The most ancient of all societies, and the only one that is natural, is the
family: and even so the children remain attached to the father only so long as
they need him for their preservation. As soon as this need ceases, the natural
bond is dissolved. The children, released from the obedience they owed to the
father, and the father, released from the care he owed his children, return
equally to independence. If they remain united, they continue so no longer
naturally, but voluntarily; and the family itself is then maintained only by
convention.
This common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to
provide for his own preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to
himself; and, as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the sole judge of
the proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes his own
master. (Rousseau 3).
In this quotation, we see Rousseau‟s definition of the state of nature which is similar to that
of Hobbes and Locke. The first point is that every man has a freedom and duty to survive.
This freedom is why man must provide for himself. This point is similar to Locke because
Locke believed that in the state of nature, man‟s political power starts from his right to
survive and the actions he takes to live. Hobbes also believed that man in the state of nature
must survive, but he took it in a different direction from Locke and Rousseau as he saw it as
a state of perpetual war. The most important insight Rousseau gives in this quotation is that
the only natural society is the family. This point is important because the family becomes a
model for Rousseau‟s government and also because it highlights that society maintained by
convention must be voluntary. For example in American society, the age of 18 is commonly
thought of as the age of true adulthood. Some of the rights that 18 year-olds are granted are
the right to vote and the right to join the military because now they are adults and are
recognized as being able to judge the course of their lives. If an 18 year-old stays at home,
he is voluntarily doing this because he now has the ability to choose his direction in life.
Because this person is mature enough to live on his own, but chooses to stay at home, this
must be a voluntary choice. It is a humble point, but it has many implications. One
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implication is that a person who is mature enough to be able to decide his own life and what
is proper for providing for himself can only participate in a community by his own volition.
This idea is very much like Locke‟s idea of political consent in justifying the legitimacy of
government. On the idea of political consent, at least, Rousseau and Locke agree. Another
point that is important from Rousseau‟s discussion of the beginning of societies is that “[t]he
family then may be called the first model of political societies: the ruler corresponds to the
father, and the people to the children; and all, being born free and equal, alienate their liberty
only for their own advantage” (Rousseau 3). Rousseau was concerned with the idea that
family be the first model of political societies because he was concerned that people maintain
their natural power, which is that they are free and equal to decide their own life and they
only give up their liberty if it is for their betterment. We have seen this idea of voluntarily
giving up liberty with Locke, and we see it again as Rousseau‟s ideas develop. But at this
point, we can at least understand that by Rousseau‟s social contract theory, as with Hobbes
and Locke, the Internet can still be viewed as individuals in the state of nature.
After Rousseau establishes the idea of voluntary participation in communities, he
begins to investigate how political communities form. First, he attacks the idea that strength
of force legitimizes governments. He states, “Force is a physical power, and I fail to see
what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will—at most,
an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a duty?” (Rousseau 5). In this quotation, we first
see that Rousseau does not believe that force is a path to morality. His argument is that
responding to force is simply a reflex, an act of survival. For example if someone is
throwing a punch at another person, that person should dodge the punch or defend against it
in another way. The response does not have any moral implications; it is a necessary way to
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survive and preserve one‟s life which is everyone‟s natural right. But, there is a hint of
where morality comes from in Rousseau‟s quotation: will. The idea of will deciding
morality will come up more in Rousseau‟s theory. To further show that force does not justify
right, Rousseau stated:
…if force creates right, the effect changes with the cause: every force that is
greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey
with impunity, disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest being always in
the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest.
But what kind of right is that which perishes when force fails? If we must
obey perforce, there is no need to obey because we ought; and if we are not
forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do so. Clearly, the word “right”
adds nothing to force: in this connection, it means absolutely nothing.
(Rousseau 5).
Again, Rousseau has provided an argument against force as a justification for righteousness.
To illustrate Rousseau‟s point, consider the following example: one person has decided to
build a park and has the force to make others build the park. Therefore, building the park is
the right choice. Another person decides a golf course should be built instead of the park.
This person has enough force to make others abandon building the park and build the golf
course instead. By the original argument, the golf course is now the right choice because
there was more force behind the decision. If someone decides to build something else and
has the power to make others do it instead of the golf course, then that decision will be the
right one and so on and so on. And, this changing of decisions is not wrong because it is
being justified by force. By Rousseau‟s argument, there is no moral value in this situation
when right is only decided by force because the moral value is distorted and people act
according to survival instinct, not morality. What becomes right is what is able to be forced
upon the people against their will. An entity with more force can impose another will and so
forth. Rousseau also realized that if you are only obeying an authority because of force, then
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you do not have to obey that authority anymore when you have more force because then you
can impose your own will against the authority‟s will. This is why Rousseau stated, “Let us
then admit that force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate
powers” (Rousseau 6). This point is important because it justifies that legitimate political
power cannot be formed from strength of force and that morality cannot be pursued through
force. Rousseau will continue to weave this thread of legitimate power tied to morality
throughout his fabric of social contract theory, as well as voluntary consent.
At this point, it is now understood that Rousseau defined the state of nature as
everyone is responsible for their own preservation. When a person reaches a certain age, that
person is the sole judge of his life. It is also understood that a government is only legitimate
if the people voluntarily obey it and that political power is properly empowered by the
people‟s consent in relinquishing their own power. With Rousseau‟s reasoning that force
alone cannot lead to legitimate authority, he sets himself the task to determine what will
create legitimate authority. His first step is to define the social contract:
…as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his selfpreservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and
neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on my
present subject, may be stated in the following terms:
“The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect
with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in
which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and
remain as free as before.” This is the fundamental problem of which the
Social Contract provides the solution.
The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that
the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that,
although they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere
the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized, until, on the
violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes
his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in favor of which he
renounced it. (Rousseau 13-14).
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So Rousseau‟s social contract theory is that a group of people form a contract where each
person retains his liberty, but the people gain the common force, or power, of all the
participants in the contract to preserve themselves and their goods. But, the key difference
between Rousseau‟s theory and that of Hobbes and Locke is that he proposes that each
person “…may still obey himself alone…” (Rousseau 13). In other words, Rousseau‟s
theory requires that the true power of the social contract rests with the individual person.
Rousseau explains this concept as the following:
…each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is
no associate over which he does not acquire the same right as he yields others
over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase
of force for the preservation of what he has.
If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we
shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms:
“Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme
direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each
member as an indivisible part of the whole.” (Rousseau 14).
At this point, we reach the very essence of Rousseau‟s social contract theory: the general
will. There are several key points in this passage. First, each person that is a part of the
social contract is no better or worse than any other person. Everyone has the same right and
power in the whole. Second, each person gives up something to gain the force to preserve
his possessions, but gains an equivalent in the community. For example a person may give
up the right to kill others when they wrong him, but then the community will judge the
transgressors for him and enforce the sentence. Last, the essence of the social contract is
when it is formed according to the general will. The general will is central to understanding
Rousseau‟s social contract theory so it deserves further examination.
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Arthur Ripstein stated of Rousseau, “While Hobbes is interested in the causal powers
of institutions to motivate, and Locke in the possibility of legitimate institutions, Rousseau‟s
concern is with the possibility of institutions at all. Rousseau wants to know how an
aggregate of persons can become a creator of rights and obligations, able to coerce its
members on grounds of freedom” (Ripstein 219).

Essentially, Rousseau wanted to

understand how a social contract could legitimately form if each individual was to retain his
individual rights and powers and how that social contract could direct its members. So,
Rousseau developed the idea of the general will. The general will is akin to universal law,
which is how Immanuel Kant was inspired by Rousseau in his description of the categorical
imperative (Johnson). To understand the general will, first understand that each individual
has different desires in life; therefore, each individual has a will that is distinct from the will
of every other person. Now, according to Rousseau:
Our will is always for our own good, but we do not always see what that is;
the people is never corrupted, but it is often deceived, and on such occasions
only does it seem to will what is bad.
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the
general will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former
takes private interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular
wills: but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel
one another…and the general will remains as the sum of the differences.
(Rousseau 30).
So, to Rousseau, the general will is will that is only concerned with the common good. The
will of all is simply the summation of each person‟s individual desires. For example, one
person may desire that a hotel is built. Another person desires that a park is built instead. A
third person desires that a baseball field is built. And so on. According to Rousseau, the
general will is discovered when you eliminate the individual desires. In the above example,
the desire to build the hotel cancels the desire to build the park or the baseball field. Any of
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these choices is as likely to be the right one as any of the others. As Ripstein states, “If the
general will governs the conditions of interaction of the community, it would survive the
cancellation of any individual desires by conflicting desires. The general will is the „sum of
the differences‟ not because it is not canceled, but because it cannot be canceled by
individual desires” (Ripstein 225). So in the above example, the desires of building the park
and hotel and baseball field cancel each other, but the general will is that something should
be built. A more specific general will could be that something should be built that is for the
community to use without profiting a private entity. As such, building a park or baseball
field is closer to the general will than building a hotel, but either the park or baseball field
could be the right choice. Individuals may not agree on what should be built, but they all
share the desire that something should be built and possibly that whatever is built is for the
good of the public and not only a private entity. What is important to understand is that
Rousseau saw the general will as the choice that emerged from the entire community as the
right choice and that this general will is revealed when you eliminate the choices that are
only concerned with an individual and not the community.

One important thing to

understand at this point is that each individual retains the same power as every other
individual even though there is a general will that is concerned with the common good. In
terms of the Internet, part of applying Rousseau‟s social contract theory is in determining the
general will of the collective of individual Internet entities which is what I attempted in my
research and describe in the next chapter. With this definition of general will, it is time to
turn to Rousseau‟s sovereign.
According to Rousseau, the sovereign is the power of the community that acts in
accordance with the general will to ensure the common good of all members of the
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community.

As such, Rousseau stated, “…the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the

individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and
consequently the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is
impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members” (Rousseau 17). Again, each person‟s
interest is just as important as any other person‟s interest. But, it is in discussing the
sovereign that Rousseau makes a startling and controversial conclusion. He stated, “In order
then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking,
which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be
compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to
be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him
against all personal dependence” (Rousseau 18). At this point, we see the “socialist” part of
Rousseau‟s theory because the individual who is not in line with the general will shall be
forced to follow the general will. But to completely understand this point objectively, we
need to remember the context of Rousseau‟s history. He was a great admirer of Sparta, an
ancient society where everyone was taught to place the needs and preservation of the
community above themselves. But in preserving the community, they also ensured their own
personal survival.

It is also important to remember that Rousseau‟s highest goal for

government is to help the individual develop morally. So in Rousseau‟s theory, the general
will represents what is good for everyone. As everyone maintains their individual rights
within the sovereign, the highest moral good is that the sovereign, each person in the whole,
acts in accordance with the general will. This statement simply means that the group
collectively works for the common good. While it sounds harsh to force someone to follow
the general will, Rousseau‟s idea is that the individual should subjugate to the community to
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achieve this highest moral good of acting with the general will which is for the common
good. Again, the community is more important than the individual; but in ensuring the
community‟s survival and preservation, the individual also benefits. It is at this point, we
also see more of Rousseau‟s circular reasoning. According to Patrick Riley, “The standard
which gives will its object is the very negation of voluntarism. And it is for this reason that
Rousseau‟s political system is somewhat paradoxical. The idea of general will, the paradox
of cause and effect in the contractual situation, the circularity of the concept of virtue—all
these are due to an attempt to fuse the advantages of a politics founded on will, and of one
founded on reason and perfection” (Riley 185).

As Rousseau defines the civil state,

“Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some advantages which he got from nature,
he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so
extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted, that, did not the abuses of
this new condition often degrade him below that which he left, he would be bound to bless
continually the happy moment which took him from it forever, and, instead of a stupid and
unimaginative animal, made him an intelligent being and a man” (Rousseau 19). So, the
highest ideal of the sovereign and this community is to help individuals reach the moral point
where each individual is focused in accordance with the general will for the common good.
But, the sovereign is formed when people are already in accordance and making decisions for
the general will as the sovereign is the result of the general will ensuring that there is a
power that can enforce the general will. This situation results in a chicken and egg question:
which came first, the sovereign or the general will? This weak point in Rousseau‟s theory is
a point of contention amongst Rousseau‟s critics. And, it is a paradox that must be known
when studying Rousseau because general will and sovereignty are the essential ingredients in
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his theory. As he stated, “The first and most important deduction from the principles we
have so far laid down is the general will alone can direct the State according to the object for
which it was instituted, i.e., the common good: for if the clashing of particular interests made
the establishment of societies necessary, the agreement of these very interests made it
possible…It is solely on the basis of this common interest that every society should be
governed” (Rousseau 26). Again, Rousseau is interested in a government that improves the
morality of the individual as he understands that the common good should guide how society
is governed. It is interesting that Rousseau agrees with Hobbes that the power should be kept
with the sovereign. But because Rousseau sees the sovereign as empowered by the general
will formed by every individual in the community, he is attempting to reconcile a
government that can direct the collective of individuals towards the common good while at
the same time each individual is completely free to govern himself. As Riley states: “The
general will has continued to be taken seriously because it is an attempted (though not
explicit) amalgam of two extremely important traditions of political thought, which may be
called, roughly, ancient „cohesiveness‟ and modern „voluntarism‟” (Riley 167). These
points are important to understand as we explore social contract theory in the Internet
because the Internet is composed of many individual Internet users. Each person that goes
online to perform some task or use some service is an individual with personal desires and an
individual will. If we are to understand the Internet through Rousseau‟s eyes, then we must
understand how a general will could manifest itself on the Internet through this collective of
individuals; however, the vagueness of Rousseau‟s general will creates complications in
applying his theory.
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With Rousseau‟s ideas of the general will and the sovereign understood, it is time to
examine some of the practical consequences and results of Rousseau‟s theory. First, in terms
of laws, Rousseau stated that, “The people, being subject to the laws, ought to be their
author: the conditions of the society ought to be regulated solely by those who come together
to form it” (Rousseau 41). Again, the idea that the citizens make the laws stresses how
Rousseau feels that the power of government rests with the individuals even though the
individuals should act in accordance with the general will. In supporting this point, Rousseau
devotes an entire section to voting. Rousseau stated, “When in the popular assembly a law is
proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal,
but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving
his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes”
(Rousseau 116). In other words, every citizen votes on a law and the majority of the votes
determine if the law is in accordance with the common good or not.

The practical

consequence of this theory though is that the size of the group of people has to be taken into
consideration. As Rousseau identified, “In every body politic there is a maximum strength
which it cannot exceed and which it only loses by increasing in size. Every extension of the
social tie means it relaxation; and, generally speaking, a small State is stronger in proportion
than a great one” (Rousseau 48). In other words, decisions are harder to make when there are
many individuals as opposed to fewer individuals. And if every individual should have a
vote on any law, voting becomes more impractical as the number of people grows. Size of
land is also a factor. As Rousseau stated, “The men make the State, and the territory sustains
the men; the right relation therefore is that the land should suffice for the maintenance of the
inhabitants, and that there should be as many inhabitants as the land can maintain” (Rousseau
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51). In other words if a group of people is living on land that cannot sustain them, it does not
matter if the sovereign is working for the general will because it is not possible to preserve
the citizens on land that is not able to support them.
But, there is another problem with general will and sovereignty as defined by
Rousseau. As John Charvet stated:
Since the general will legitimatized constitution specifies a supreme popular
legislative assembly operating a majority decision procedure, we can say that
the constitutional sovereign—the final decision-making will—is the majority
will of the people‟s legislative assembly…This majority will may not, on
occasion, will the general will. Since the general will is said to be sovereign,
and indeed to possess absolute sovereignty, it must be sovereignty in a
different sense from that in which the majority will is constitutional sovereign.
Rousseau says that when the majority is not willing in accordance with the
general will, freedom no longer exists…However, [Rousseau‟s] account of the
contract includes the standard contractarian argument, to be found in Hobbes
and Locke and others, that a necessary condition of political society is the
surrender by each contractor of the right of private judgement [sic] that he
possessed in the state of nature… (Charvet 205-206).
There are two problems with Rousseau‟s theory that Charvet has identified. First, the
practical matter of government requires that a sovereign is in place to make decisions. But,
this sovereign will follow majority will like in the above example of voting. However, the
majority will may or may not agree with the general will which is concerned with the public
good. So, there is a practical sovereign and the conceptual sovereign that Rousseau reveres.
This situation creates the second problem. If majority will does not always coincide with
Rousseau‟s conceptual general will, then the majority will that is making decisions in the
community is not always in line with the common good. Simply put, what if the majority
will is wrong? According to Rousseau, most situations will require simply going along with
the majority according to standard contract rules. But, this situation creates problems. For
example, what if the majority decides to do away with income taxes? This decision would
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not be for the common good because then the government would not have the funds to ensure
the community‟s preservation. So this decision is likely not in line with the general will, yet
it will take precedence because it is in line with the majority will. And Rousseau would say
that in order to benefit from the community contract, it is necessary to follow this decision.
So each individual is supposed to be free, but each individual is forced to follow the majority.
These situations are just some of the practical consequences that result from Rousseau‟s
theory that will transfer when applying Rousseau‟s social contract theory to the Internet. In
determining the general will of individual Internet users, it will likely require understanding
the majority will as the majority will is easier to determine than the vague general will.
However, the consequence is that the majority will does not always conform to the general
will.
Rousseau‟s social contract theory contains many other points, such as it is permissible
for the sovereign to entrust enforcement power. If the power is entrusted to a representative
body of people, a democracy is formed. If the power is entrusted with a small group of elite
individuals, there is an aristocracy; and, if the power is entrusted in one person, there is a
monarchy (Rousseau 69). But, the sovereign still maintains the true power. And, the people
must continually consent to the laws and government. Even though Rousseau knew that
changes to the government can be dangerous, he did state that it should be changed “…when
it comes to be incompatible with the public good; but the circumspection this involves is a
maxim of policy and not a rule of right, and the State is no more bound to leave civil
authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals”
(Rousseau 108). Rousseau also identified “That All Forms of Government Do Not Suit All
Countries” (Rousseau 84). Again based on size of people and land, government would take
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various forms. But whatever form government takes, it must be by a sovereign who works in
accordance with the general will.

And as every individual is charged with his own

preservation, the contract with the sovereign must be formed voluntarily. There are the
practical problems in Rousseau‟s theory, such as the sovereign being necessary to direct the
general will while concurrently being formed from the general will. And, there is the
problem that practical majority will is not always in line with the conceptual general will.
These problems result from the real-world consequences of executing a theory that attempts
to ensure individual freedom while using government to guide everyone towards the common
good.

But, Rousseau‟s ideas of the general will and the sovereign are central to

understanding his social contract theory and two of his most important contributions to
political theory.
Now that the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau have been
presented, it is important to identify the major similarities and differences in order to show
how the Internet is structured and how interactions between entities occur on the Internet
according to social contract theory. The first similarity to understand is how they all describe
the state of nature. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau agree that in the natural state men and
women are essentially equal. People have equal abilities and capabilities. The people also
share the need to survive; in most cases, people will have to labor to survive. And, all people
also have their own desires that they seek to fulfill as long as they have ensured their
survival. But, there is a key difference between how Hobbes viewed the state of nature as
opposed to how Locke and Rousseau viewed the state of nature. Hobbes viewed the state of
nature as chaotic where everyone warred against everyone. As such, Hobbes felt a sovereign
was needed to control the people absolutely. To Hobbes, even a tyrant was preferable to the
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anarchy of nature. On the other hand, Locke and Rousseau were not so damning of people in
the state of nature. They did not feel nature was a haven for anarchy and war. Locke and
Rousseau even allowed for the possibility that people in the state of nature could still
cooperate to ensure their survival more easily, even if they were not in a formal community.
It is for this reason that they were adamant that governments must have the consent of the
people to rule over them. Since Locke and Rousseau did not see the state of nature as
negatively as Hobbes did, people must be willing to give up some of their freedoms and
natural rights to leave the state of nature and be ruled over by the government. If they choose
not to give their consent, they can always continue to live in the state of nature. Additionally,
this situation leaves the possibility that a community can be in the state of nature with regards
to other people and communities. Each community is governed by laws, but they are in the
state of nature in their relationships with each other. As I show these ideas applied to the
Internet, we will see Hobbesians and Lockeans existing on the Internet. Hobbesians are
distrusting; while Lockeans are reasonable and cooperative. And as there are individual
Internet users on multiple levels, it is possible to see different social contract theories present
in various ways.
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau also agreed that the purpose of government was to
ensure that all members in the community meet the basic needs for survival. They agreed
that government extended its power to control the community, with laws, to ensure that
threats to the community, internal or external, are defended against. But, there are some
subtle differences between the theories that I will highlight. First, as Hobbes viewed the state
of nature as chaotic, his sovereign had absolute control over the community. People had to
submit wholly to the sovereign, and the sovereign‟s will was supreme. This situation could
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result in tyranny, but this situation was better than Hobbes‟s state of nature as long as the
sovereign was not murdering the citizens without cause. In contrast, Locke was concerned
that people were governed by their consent even after the community was established. As
such, tyranny was a situation Locke wished to avoid. So, Locke‟s form of government had
separation of powers to ensure that no one person had too much power. Additionally, people
did have the right to overthrow the government if it no longer served their interests. Locke
felt the government not only should protect their natural rights, but also the fruits of their
labors, like property.

Rousseau was also concerned that government should rule with

consent of the governed, but he also envisioned a sovereign. However, Rousseau‟s sovereign
is very different from Hobbes‟s sovereign. Rousseau‟s sovereign was charged to act with the
general will, the will concerned with the common good of the community. As such, the
sovereign was empowered and formed from the general will. Because of this situation,
unlike Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau saw government as a way for the community to improve
morally by always acting in accordance with the general will for the common good. And
because the government was empowered by the general will, Rousseau‟s sovereign is
actually the collective of individuals of the community.

With this in mind, Rousseau

understood that factors, such as community size and distance between people, could affect
the power of the sovereign to act because it was harder to coordinate decisions amongst large
groups of people or across great distances. But, Rousseau probably did not envision the
Internet where distance is not as much of a problem. While there are physical distances
between the physical components that comprise the Internet, in the virtual side of the Internet
distances are not as troublesome. It is possible to visit a website in another country and
communicate with other users that are far away in seconds, so it is possible to have larger
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communities on the Internet through Rousseau‟s theory.

With social contract theory and

these key points understood, it is time to examine how the Internet is structured while
exploring how the various social contract theories apply to the Internet.
As someone who is very familiar with the Internet through my career in computer
security, I found it very illuminating to re-examine the structure of the Internet and the
various interactions between individual Internet entities through the lens of classical social
contract theory. I conducted several field investigations to better understand what I already
know about the technical structure of the Internet, but also to reveal the characteristics of
social contract theory that I expected to see based on my research of Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. From the beginning, I have stated that my purpose has been to show how classical
social contract theory can help in understanding how Internet is currently implicitly
governed. By understanding this Internet governance, it then becomes possible to explore
ethical issues within this model. In the next chapter, I describe the technical structure of the
Internet and how this structure has created an environment that is well-suited to realizing
classical social contract theory because there are relationships that have formed that follow
the theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. As I describe the field investigations, I show
how they reveal the relationships on the Internet that parallel the characteristics I have
summarized from social contract theory. In doing so, I prove that Internet governance, in the
form of the relationships and interactions among the individual Internet entities, can be
understood through classical social contract theory in a practical way that allows for better
exploring ethical issues on the Internet.
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Chapter 3-The Social Contract in the Internet
The first thing that must be understood with regards to the Internet is that there are
two aspects of the Internet: the virtual structure of the Internet and the physical structure of
the Internet8. I alluded to these aspects earlier in my thesis, but I now explain them in detail.
The virtual structure of the Internet is what we are all familiar with when we surf the Internet.
From any computer in the world, we expect to be able to see the various websites we like to
explore. And these websites are essentially the same whether we surf the Internet on a
personal computer (PC), laptop, personal data assistant (PDA), personal cellular phone, etc.
The physical structure of the Internet is the collective of physical devices, such as routers,
servers, computers, etc., on which the virtual structure of the Internet, formed by the software
of the various websites, resides. It is not necessary to understand all of the intricacies of
networks and the various devices and systems that make the Internet possible, but it is
important to understand the high-level view of how the Internet is structured so that the
various interactions and relationships among Internet entities can be understood through
social contract theory.
I will begin describing the building blocks of the Internet starting with single users, or
single Internet entities. As I describe these building blocks, I will also show how the social
contract views of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau appear in the interactions among these
blocks. As this description unfolds, there are several key threads to pay attention to: 1) the
state of nature at the building blocks; 2) the two parts of the Internet, the virtual and the

8

For those of you familiar with the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network model or other network
models, I hope you are not offended by these definitions. For the purpose of this thesis, it is only necessary to
understand that there is a physical structure on which the Internet we see resides. For those of you who would
like to understand more about networks, understanding the OSI model is a good start for further research.
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physical; 3) the interactions among each of the Internet entities; and 4) how the views of
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau appear through these interactions.
First, I begin with the most basic element of the Internet: single users. The
following figure shows two single users: Alice and Bob.

Figure 1: Single Internet Users9

In the above figure, Alice is using a PC and Bob is using a laptop. Even in this simple
illustration of two single users, there are building blocks for the Internet. First, both Alice
and Bob have local web pages on their machines. In other words, there is a local virtual
Internet on each physical machine. Alice and Bob can each explore help pages, program
information, directories, etc. using their Internet browsers. To clarify, a local machine, or
local host, is what I am referring to as housing the local Internet.

At this level I am

describing, this local Internet does not have any connections to outside networks. It is
strictly the virtual Internet environment that resides on the user‟s local host machine. With
that being stated, I will expand on the key threads that I mentioned earlier in this chapter.
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First, the state of nature in this situation is that there are two individuals. These individuals
do not have a connection to the outside Internet, the World Wide Web, just the local Internet
on their individual machines. But, they are still able to explore this local Internet. The
following figure shows an example of such local “surfing.”

Figure 2: Local Surfing

In this figure, I have explored the same directory on my computer: first, through the
Windows® explorer most people are familiar with; then, through an Internet browser 10. This
example is simply an illustration that there is a local Internet available to single users. In this
state of nature, single users are able to explore freely on their computer with no restrictions.
This statement means that single users have complete freedom in their local surfing, but it

9

All figures are either original pictures, original compilations from referenced art, or original screenshots of
referenced websites. The footnotes for each figure contain the abbreviated citations of any non-original
material. The full citations are contained in the References section. (C) (L)
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also means they are the only ones responsible for their local surfing. In other words if they
want to maintain their local surfing, they need to take whatever steps are necessary to
perform this surfing, such as preserving the physical structure on which this local Internet
resides.

This situation is similar to the state of nature Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau

described in that men in the state of nature are able to pursue their individual desires as long
as their needs for survival are met. In this state of nature, the reason single users have this
freedom and responsibility with regards to the local Internet is because they control this
physical structure. In most cases, single users own this device11. This situation brings us to
the next thread.
As shown in the example above, there is a virtual part to the local Internet. In this
example, it is the view of the directory I explored. But, there is also a physical structure to
this local Internet. This physical structure at the highest level is the actual computer I used.
At the lowest level, the physical structure comprises the actual bits of data saved on my hard
drive in the computer. It is not important to understand this physical structure completely,
but it is important to know that it exists. It is also important to understand, as stated earlier,
that the physical structure has influence over the virtual structure. If the computer fails, the
hard drive breaks, or there is a power outage, then I will not be able to explore the directory
as above. If I want to explore this directory, or any other area on my computer, I must
maintain the physical structure on which it resides. I must ensure that the computer works
and that it has power. If I want to consider future use, I must also think of security, such as

10

Windows® is a trademarked property of the Microsoft Corporation. Mozilla Firefox is a property of Mozilla
Corporation.
11

An exception is that guest users on a local computer may not have the same authorization as administrators to
explore all areas of the computer. If this is the case, then guest users will find some areas blocked. This
situation may be the result of the guest user not owning the computer, but instead using the computer of another
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physically protecting the computer so it is not damaged and backing up my data on multiple
hard drives for redundancy. So in the first example, Alice and Bob are each responsible for
their computers; and, Alice and Bob must maintain those computers in order to explore their
local Internets. Another way that the physical structure influences the virtual structure is that
computers have different capabilities in terms of performance.

For example Alice‟s

computer may be able to store more data, but Bob‟s laptop may process data faster and allow
him to explore his directories quicker. The difference in physical performance will change
the way the virtual structure is explored and used, which leads to the next thread of how
interactions occur at this level.
Alice and Bob are free to explore their individual local Internets; since there are no
connections to an outside network, Alice and Bob are restricted to their own individual local
Internets. But, Alice and Bob are not limited in how they explore the local Internets. In
other words, as with Locke‟s and Rousseau‟s definition of man in the state of nature, there
are no limits on Alice‟s and Bob‟s desires. But, there are limits on their capabilities. They
are free to explore the local Internets, but they are not capable of exploring beyond them at
this point. This freedom leads to the last thread of how classical social contract theory
applies to the single user.
As shown in the preceding sections, single Internet users are individuals with
complete freedom and control in exploring the local Internet that resides on their individual
machines.

They essentially have no restrictions on where they wish to go within the

individual or company. As such, the guest user does not have the same control over the physical structure
because he doesn‟t own it.
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machine12. As such, a single Internet user is the equivalent of Hobbes‟s sovereign with
regards to his local machine. It may seem unusual to think of Alice and Bob as sovereigns,
but let‟s review Hobbes‟s understanding of the sovereign. Hobbes‟s sovereign has complete
control over a community in order to direct that community for proper survival and
development.

Hobbes‟s sovereign has power over life and death.

Additionally, this

Leviathan ensures that the community does not degrade into a state of anarchy. While the
local Internet is not a political community, there are parallels that can be drawn here. First, a
single Internet user has complete control of both the virtual structure and the physical
structure for the local Internet. Second, the single Internet user has complete responsibility
for the local Internet. In order for the local Internet to exist, without degrading into chaos,
the single user must exercise total control of the local Internet. The single user must also
assume total responsibility for protecting the Internet, since the single user controls the
physical structure of the local Internet. While it may seem trivial at the moment that a single
user is completely responsible for the local Internet as Hobbes‟s Leviathan is completely
responsible for a political community, this connection is important to make as we see the
structure of the Internet develop. But, a key point to keep in mind is that a single user is not
elected by the community; the single user is the equivalent of Hobbes‟s sovereign because
that single user owns the physical structure on which the local Internet resides.
But, another way to view the single user is through Locke‟s social contract theory.
As reviewed earlier, even at the level of single user there is a physical structure and a virtual
structure of the Internet. But another way to understand this structure is as property, which is

12

As stated earlier, the exception is that guests may not have full access to a computer‟s resources as does an
administrator. This situation is common in companies where employees have limited accounts that allow them
to perform their job function, but only system administrators can control everything on the computer. This
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a key component of Locke‟s social contract theory as it is the result of a person‟s labor.
When a person owns a computer, they own the physical structure of the Internet and the
virtual structure of the local Internet. The person has files on the computer, personal data,
created documents, etc. Even if the person is using software he did not develop, he has
labored to pay for the rights to use that software. He also owns his personal data associated
with that software. For example if a person purchases a computer video game, he has paid
for the right to use that game on his computer. Unless the game‟s developers allow it, he
may not have access to the source code from which the game is formed. But, he will own the
right to use the computer game on his personal physical property which means he will also
own the data on his computer associated with that game, such as saved games, personal game
profiles, etc. It is important to recognize this property, both virtual and physical, because
together they will help create a person‟s identity on the Internet. The important point to
understand at this level of investigation is that a single user can be viewed as Hobbes‟s
sovereign, in the sense of retaining ultimate control and power of the local Internet, or as a
Lockean with the personal stake of protecting his property, both virtual and physical in the
state of nature.
Having explored the single Internet user through classical social contract theory, it is
time to consider what happens when Alice and Bob decide to connect their local Internets to
facilitate more Internet surfing. The below figure shows some ways Alice and Bob may
connect their local Internets to form a “larger” Internet.

situation allows a company to safeguard the computers it is responsible for, and this will be addressed further in
this thesis. However, it is true that guests can explore the computer completely within their boundaries.
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Figure 3: Two-Person Network13

In this figure, we see Alice and Bob connecting their machines in three different ways.
These ways are not the only ways they could connect their computers, but it illustrates some

13

(C) (H) (L) (WF)
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common ways. In the first method, Alice and Bob connect their computers directly using a
crossover Ethernet cable. In the second method, Alice and Bob connect their computers by
connecting to a hub. A hub is a physical device that allows computers to connect together on
a common communication medium, and it acts as a relay for sending the information
between the machines connected on the hub.

In the third method, Alice and Bob have

established a wireless ad hoc network. It is not important to understand all of the particulars
of how these different methods work, but it is important to understand that now Alice and
Bob are connected on a network that joins their two machines allowing them to have a twoperson Internet. The more technical term for this two-person Internet is a local area network
(LAN). With this LAN established, let‟s revisit the four threads that I have explored.
The first thread is the state of nature. We still have the situation that Alice and Bob
are individuals with regards to the local Internet, but now there is a relationship to each other
through the LAN they have established. We will revisit this relationship further; but for now
it should be understood that if Alice and Bob wish to share information or explore the LAN,
there has to be some type of agreement between them on how this interaction will occur.
Secondly, we have already explored how the individual machines affect the virtual Internet,
but now we must consider the physical connections and devices allowing the LAN. As stated
earlier the examples shown above are not all-inclusive, but there are characteristics that all
physical connections have in common. First, there is a limit on distance. Cables have a
certain distance that can be used before signal degradation requires another device to amplify
the signal to keep it strong. Even wireless connections have a distance limit. You can liken
this to losing radio station signals from driving out of range of the transmitters. As before,
the physical devices allowing the connections must be maintained, but they must also be
71

managed according to the agreement that Alice and Bob form for their interaction on this
LAN. This point brings us to the next thread concerning interactions.
For Alice and Bob to interact, as stated already, they need an agreement about how
they will utilize the LAN. For example, they could use the LAN to share their local
machines completely. Or, they may only want to share some information. Maybe their LAN
will be a temporary setup for a quick information transfer; or, they may want to set up a
permanent LAN to facilitate long-term interaction. Additionally, they will need to account
for how close they want to be to each other physically when connected to the LAN. For
example, will they connect the LAN in the same room or will they want to be in separate
rooms in the same house? In any case, Alice and Bob will have to create a physical structure
that will facilitate the interaction they want to have on the LAN. As noted earlier, the
physical infrastructure will influence how the virtual Internet will function. But, now how
does social contract theory manifest itself in this LAN?
As noted before in the example of single users, both Alice and Bob are essentially
Leviathans with regards to their personal local Internets or they can be viewed as Lockeans
with personal property interests. But, in this LAN there is an additional relationship that has
been established: the information sharing between Alice and Bob. And, it can take on one of
two forms. If Thomas Hobbes was reviewing this LAN, he would see Alice and Bob as in
the “state of war.” As such, he would expect Alice and Bob to not trust each other.
Essentially, Hobbes would expect both Alice and Bob to act only in accordance with their
personal best interests, even if it means that Alice and Bob may seek to improve their
separate positions by undermining each other. Alice and Bob may have to set up the LAN
for survival, but they would most likely desire a network that would facilitate the minimum
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possible interaction they require. They may place a firewall, intrusion prevention system
(IPS), and other components that would allow them to connect to share information; but, the
components would also allow Alice and Bob to protect themselves from sharing too much
information with each other. The components would also allow Alice and Bob to protect
themselves from computer-based attacks from each other. Additionally, Alice and Bob may
disconnect the network once it is no longer needed. With all of these safeguards in place,
Alice and Bob may still seek to undermine each other to gain an upper hand over the other.
If John Locke was reviewing this LAN, he would recognize that Alice and Bob may
be able to cooperate with each other without being distrustful. While he would approve of
some basic protective components as a computer network equivalent of political checks and
balances, he may not expect that Alice and Bob will simply use the LAN as an opportunity to
attack each other to better their personal positions as Hobbes would. Locke would recognize
that Alice and Bob can share the LAN and benefit mutually.

But, Locke would also

recognize that Alice and Bob have property they must protect. These properties Alice and
Bob must protect are their local machines and contents, as was described earlier. For a
Lockean relationship Alice and Bob would likely employ a basic network with some minimal
protection, but they would not be immediately distrustful of each other. In this Lockean
relationship, Alice and Bob could exchange information in a mutually beneficial way. The
main point to understand is the point I established earlier in my description of classical social
contract theory: the differing views of Hobbes and Locke in terms of social contract theory
first develop from their differing views of how people act in the state of nature. As such, the
differing views of how people act in the state of nature can also be translated to the Internet.
Let me expand on this explanation with a practical example.
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If I establish a connection with someone, or an outside network, that I do not trust or
know well enough, I treat the situation as a Hobbesian situation. I make sure I have all of my
software protections enabled: anti-virus software; firewall; anti-spyware; etc. If possible, I
also place additional physical devices between my computer and the outside entity that
further guard my computer. With these layers of protection, I will still disconnect from the
outside entity when the connection is no longer required. These actions are in contrast to
how I act when I connect my computer to a trusted network or friend. I simply connect my
computer and begin using the established network connection. I act this way in this situation
because even though I still have no physical control or ownership of the outside entity, I have
a reasonable trust that the connection will not be abused or my property compromised by
using the network. As with any exchange of services, there are costs and benefits to using
outside networks. Each situation requires an assessment of these costs and benefits; and, this
assessment will determine if the relationship to the outside entity should be Hobbesian or
Lockean. This situation parallels a well-known maxim in computer security: security and
convenience must be constantly balanced. As more security is placed on an information
asset, it is usually less convenient to use that information asset. The more convenience in
using an information asset usually indicates that it is less secure. The amount of security
must be weighed against the usability of the information asset according to its intended
function. For example, some video games that are played across the Internet require relaxing
some protections on the computer and the local network to allow speed and real-time
playing. But, online bank transactions require more security even if there is a cost in time to
establish these connections.
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These same threads and situations result if we add Charlie to the group.

The

following figure shows how this interaction might happen.

Figure 4: Three-Person LAN14

In the above figure, Alice is connected directly to a wireless router by an Ethernet cable.
Bob is connecting to the same wireless router using a wireless connection. Charlie is also
connecting to the router wirelessly, but Charlie is using a PDA instead of a PC or laptop. As
earlier, we see the same characteristics and threads under review. First, Alice, Bob, and

14

(C) (L) (P) (WF) (WR)
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Charlie are individuals with ownership and responsibility for their individual devices, but
they now have a relationship with each other through the LAN. The LAN is influenced by
the physical infrastructure. Alice, Bob, and Charlie are restricted by physical distance in
their network based on the physical capabilities of the components used. Alice, Bob, and
Charlie can also decide how their interactions through the LAN will occur. And, again, the
interactions can be observed as Hobbesian, state of war, or Lockean, cooperative state of
nature. The new aspect that is added, however, is that perhaps two out of the three users
cooperate while distrusting the third. For example as Alice and Bob have been working with
each other, they may allow each other more access to their individual local Internets. But,
they distrust Charlie so they make sure their LAN is protected from him. In this example,
Alice and Bob are acting in a Lockean way with each other while treating Charlie in a
Hobbesian way as an outsider to their LAN. The following figure shows how these two
LANs may interact. As shown there is a common area for both LANs, but there are distinct
zones of interaction. The blue oval signifies how Alice and Bob establish rules for their
interaction; and, the red oval signifies the rules that govern Charlie‟s interaction with Alice
and Bob.
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Figure 5: Three-Person LAN with Two Different Relationships 15

Now while I have explored simple building blocks to this point, the Internet becomes
formed from these building blocks. Individual users join LANs. LANs form into wide area
networks (WANs) to cover more distance. WANs form into metropolitan area networks
(MANs) to interact with WANs in a city. And, so on. The Internet is usually nicknamed the

15

(C) (L) (P) (WF) (WR)

77

“Information Superhighway16.” This is an appropriate nickname because of how these
networks form.

For example, consider the interstate highway system.

It would be

impractical for El Paso, Texas, to have a highway straight to New York City, New York, and
to Atlanta, Georgia, and to every other city in the United States of America. It would not be
possible to have that many highways leaving any one city. Instead, you have several major
highways leaving a city. These highways lead to various junctions that connect to other
highways. People can change highways and roads at various junctions in order to get to their
ultimate destination. By designing the interstate highway system in this way, there are as
minimal “connections” among cities as possible. Heavily travelled areas will have more
highways than less travelled areas. And it is not necessary to spend the money, labor, and
time to build highways over every square inch of the United States.
The same “road building” situation happens with the Internet.

Cables, wireless

connections, satellite connections, etc. all have physical limits. And, it would be impossible
and impractical to connect every person to every other person in the world. While such a
situation is practical for small LANs, the Internet requires a different solution. So there are
routers, servers, and switches that serve as junctions on the “Information Superhighway.”
These junctions allow people to interact with the various virtual facets of the Internet, no
matter where they are physically located, as if they were directly connected to them.
Consider the following figure:

16

An interesting note is that during the course of developing my thesis, I was exposed to the art of Nam June
Paik (1932-2006), who first used the term “electronic superhighway” and created works of art that explored
how information and media has re-defined American culture (Nam June Paik). I think this is true of the
Internet, which is why I explored it in this thesis.
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Figure 6: Google™ Website17

The above figure is a screenshot of what I see when I go to the Google™ home page18 on the
virtual Internet. But, the following figure shows what happens when I trace my connection
to Google™ starting from my home computer19.

17

(GG)

18

Google™ is a registered trademark and property of Google™.

19

Note: Some information has been blocked out for security reasons.
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Figure 7: Traceroute to Google™

The above figure shows a tracert command to www.google.com, which anyone can execute
from a home computer. This command traces my connection to Google™ through the
various junctions, or “hops”, which the information from my computer has to go through in
order for me to access the Google™ home page. As the figure shows, there were 12 “hops”
between my home computer and the Google™ home page. By looking at the names and
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses20 past my network, the information went through three
routers in El Paso, Texas; then, to a router in Dallas, Texas; then through two routers in the
Dallas-Ft. Worth, Texas area; and, then through three more routers, or servers, before
reaching the server that hosted the Google™ home page. Let‟s examine this typical Internet
connection according to the threads I have detailed. First, for the state of nature, I am an

20

An IP address is essentially the equivalent of a house number, but on the Internet. IP addressing allows
routers and switches to direct data to where it needs to go.
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individual in charge of my computer with property, both physical and virtual, that I own.
But, I also manage two of the 13 connections shown above. So, I am the sovereign of my
computer as well as those two routers. Those two routers are also physical properties I own
that contain virtual properties I own. As shown in the two figures I can see the Google™
home page as part of the virtual Internet, but there is a definite physical infrastructure, part of
which I control. But, in terms of interactions, while I have personal control of part of the
physical infrastructure allowing me to communicate to the Internet, I have no control over
any of the other points.
This situation described in the previous paragraph is the situation every Internet user
is subject to; every Internet user has some physical control over the entry point to the Internet
and perhaps some devices that help this connection21, but every Internet user does not have
complete control over how he connects to the Internet. As I‟ve stated several times already,
the physical infrastructure affects the virtual structure of the Internet. For example if I decide
to not go on the Internet from my home computer, I can simply shut down my router. This
shutdown effectively takes my computer off the Internet, and there is nothing anyone can do
through the virtual Internet to change it back. On the same note if the router in Dallas shuts
down, my interaction with the Internet will be affected. It is possible that the shutdown will
prevent me from reaching certain websites, but it is more likely that my traffic will simply be
routed through other “hops” and junctions to get me to my virtual destination. The benefit of
having an Internet that is formed from many connecting nodes with redundant connections
and multiple paths, just like the interstate highway, is that traffic can simply be re-routed
21

An exception to this situation is a person connecting to the Internet from a work computer. In this case, it is
likely that the company retains complete control of the computer and restricts the employee in how he interacts
with the Internet (i.e. not visiting pornographic sites, not downloading pirated material, etc.). In some cases,
this policy is outlined in an explicit acceptable use agreement.
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when one connection is down. This situation is likened to a detour on the highway or city
street when there is construction and the road is closed. These redundant connections also
allow for multiple relationships to exist on the Internet between Internet entities. Unlike in
Rousseau‟s time, it is now possible for individuals to interact across great physical distances
instantly through the virtual Internet. But, the physical infrastructure cannot be ignored; it is
possible to control this physical infrastructure as a Hobbesian or a Lockean. And, the way
the physical aspect of the Internet is controlled will affect how the virtual aspect of the
Internet is used. The first field investigation I conducted shows the physical and virtual
aspects of the Internet and how they can be viewed through social contract theory.
For my first field investigation, I traveled around El Paso with my netbook to various
WiFi hotspots to access www.yahoo.com22. Like any good study, I minimized the variables
as much as possible so I could note the variations with some certainty. The first variable I
entered into the study is that when I used my netbook at home, I employed a wired
connection to the Internet. When I used the netbook around El Paso, I used a wireless
connection to the Internet. As I‟ve described before, the type of physical connection is not
relevant. There are differences in signal strength and distance, but both connection types
allowed me to connect to the Internet. So for this investigation, this variable is not an issue.
The other variable I introduced into the study was location. This variable is an important one
because I was accessing the Internet from different physical locations. The result that I
expected from this variable, and that is shown below, is that I would be routed through
different physical relays, or “hops”, to get me to www.yahoo.com. The last variable that was
introduced into the study was necessarily time as I had to travel to the different physical

22

www.yahoo.com is a property of Yahoo!® Inc.
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locations. The following figures are screenshots from the various locations. In each case, the
following were the constants:
1.

The same netbook was used at all locations.

2.

The destination website was the same at all locations (www.yahoo.com).

3.

The same command was used at all locations (tracert www.yahoo.com).

As you review each figure, note the differences in the tracert results. There are also
differences in the trends noted by the Yahoo!® website. I will address these trends later in
this thesis as they are an important indication of Rousseauean social contract theory. While it
is not clearly shown in the screenshot, in each case, the Yahoo!® website looked essentially
the same.23

Figure 8: Accessing Yahoo!® From West El Paso24
23

Note: Some information has been blocked out for security reasons.

24

(YH1), Note: My desktop background that is partially seen in Figures 8-17 is a Watchmen background that is
copyrighted by Paramount Pictures, Legendary Pictures, DC Comics, and Warner Bros. Studios.
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Figure 9: Accessing Yahoo!® From Central El Paso25

Figure 10: Accessing Yahoo!® From East El Paso26

25

(YH2)

26

(YH3)

84

Figure 11: Accessing Yahoo!® From Far East El Paso27

Figure 12: Accessing Yahoo!® From Home (Northeast El Paso)28

27

(YH4)

28

(YH5)
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The following table indicates the key points shown in the above screenshots.
Table 1: Variations in Accessing Yahoo!®29
Physical
Location

Connection
Type

Entry Internet
Protocol (IP)
Address

Destination IP
Address

Time
Accessed

Date
Accessed

Number
of
Hops30

West El
Paso

Wireless

10.128.43.129

209.191.122.70

6:56 P.M.

4
September
2010

14

Central El
Paso

Wireless

209.136.32.113

72.30.2.43

7:30 P.M.

4
September
2010

8

East El
Paso

Wireless

10.247.238.1

209.191.122.70

8:39 P.M.

4
September
2010

13

Far East
El Paso

Wireless

216.253.7.205

72.30.2.43

9:45 P.M.

4
September
2010

10

Home
(Northeast
El Paso)

Wired

***.***.*.*

209.191.122.70

10:42
P.M.

4
September
2010

14

The bold data indicates one constant: the date accessed. The other constants were that the
same netbook was used and the same destination website (www.yahoo.com) was accessed
from all five locations. Additionally, as shown above, the same tracert command was used
at all of the locations.

From the above table and the screenshots, there are a few

characteristics that can be ascertained from investigating the variations. First, even though
the Yahoo!® home page looked essentially the same, there are at least two redundant
destinations that host this website that are accessible from El Paso, noted by the following IP
addresses31: 209.191.122.70 and 72.30.2.43. Second, by the changes in the number of hops
and the various IP addresses of each of these hops, there are clearly differing relays to the
29

Table 1 is a compilation of data obtained from Figures 8-12, derived from (YH1), (YH2), (YH3), (YH4), and
(YH5).
30

The number of hops includes the entry and destination points.

31

Internet Protocol (IP) addresses are the virtual Internet addresses of physical devices. It is possible to fake
this address, and it is possible for a physical device to have multiple IP addresses. Detecting these differences
requires sophisticated techniques that I am not allowed to use on networks without permission from the owners.
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Yahoo!® home page from El Paso depending on from where in El Paso you attempt to gain
access to the Yahoo!® home page. There are surely other relays available around El Paso.
But this small study illustrated the point that while the virtual structure of the Internet, in this
case the Yahoo!® home page, is essentially the same, there are different physical structures
that allow a connection from a single user to the website. Although the physical structures
from each of the physical locations had some commonalities, there are enough differences to
make this claim.
But, there are other important variations to note that illustrate how differently users
can control access to the virtual Internet. First, note Figure 8 which shows the access from
West El Paso. The phrase “Request timed out” shows up in the tracert command results.
This phrase indicates that the businesses past the West El Paso business employ security
precautions to prevent this command from disclosing the IP addresses of the devices they
control. Since the IP addresses of eight relays are not shown, it is not possible to determine
how many distinct businesses control these relays. Another important variation is that the
businesses at West El Paso and East El Paso require users to agree to an acceptable use
agreement to access the virtual Internet from these locations.

The other businesses,

excluding my home network, simply allow users to connect directly to the Internet. The
West and East El Paso businesses employ these acceptable use agreements to protect
themselves from any liability should users abuse their access to the virtual Internet. What is
important to realize is that if a user does not agree to the terms of the acceptable use
agreements, then he will not be allowed to access the virtual Internet at these businesses. In
other words, the West and East El Paso businesses exert more control over their physical
structure to control how users access the virtual Internet that exists past these businesses.
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This situation is a perfect example of Hobbesian principles at work. The West and East El
Paso businesses act as sovereigns on their physical infrastructure, which in turn controls who
can access the virtual Internet through their physical infrastructure. The Central and Far East
El Paso businesses simply allow users to connect to the virtual Internet. It is possible that
they have legal documentation that exempts them from liability should the users abuse their
access to the virtual Internet, but it is not announced explicitly as with the West and East El
Paso businesses.

Even though the West and East El Paso businesses have an explicit

agreement to use their Internet access, the social contract relationship that is developed is
implicit as it is not the purpose of the agreement. And, the users do not have to agree to the
acceptable use agreement; but if they don‟t, they cannot use the Internet access from these
businesses. This agreement is likened to political consent. Even if we decide to view the
West and East El Paso businesses as Lockean, we still see a clear difference in how they
regard their property when compared to the Central and Far East El Paso businesses because
they employ more protections to safeguard their physical and virtual property.
In the larger sense, if we consider businesses on the Internet, they are essentially
single Internet entities just as single users. The only difference is that they control more
physical assets than the average single Internet user. But, the relationships I have described
scale in this direction. If a company decides to place itself and its employees on the Internet,
then there is still physical and virtual property that must be controlled and protected. Many
companies require their employees to sign acceptable use agreements that state how they are
allowed and not allowed to use the Internet through the company‟s information assets.
Additionally, many companies block certain websites out of concern for content, security,
and productivity. All of the companies I have worked for have had strict rules against
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visiting pornographic sites or video sites from company information assets. At a company
where I was a security guard during college, the computers were also physically locked down
to prevent theft. We can understand this relationship as Hobbesian because the company is
controlling the physical and virtual structure of the local Internet, but it can also be viewed as
Lockean because the company is essentially protecting its property out of concern for
business survival. And, the employees are accepting the rules of the company for their own
career survival. At the same time, the company may have connections to other companies, or
other branches of the same company, so there are Lockean business relationships of mutual
cooperation in order to exchange information. But the company must also guard itself
against competitors and other threats, so the company will at the same time act Hobbesian to
guard against threats to its survival. The important point to understand is that a case can be
made to understand the Internet relationships we are exploring through classical social
contract theory.

But, the other important point to understand is that in the dynamic

environment of the Internet, with its many paths and redundancies, it is possible to employ
different relationships at different levels depending on the needs of the Internet entity.
Ultimately, it is possible for a single Internet entity to have Hobbesian and Lockean
principles at the same time depending on who or what the entity relates with on the Internet.
In my study, I established that there are different physical structures that allow single
users to access the virtual Internet. The building blocks that I have described are present on
the Internet. There are single users, small LANs, WANs, MANs, etc. all present on the
Internet and interacting with each other. I have described how social contract theory applies
to the building blocks I‟ve described, but how does social contract theory apply to the larger
Internet? There are certainly Hobbesian and Lockean principles at work. Internet users,
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including companies, can be mistrustful of others and employ protections to ensure that their
physical and virtual property is controlled and protected.

At the same time, there are

Lockean relationships as Internet users must have trustful and cooperative relationships with
other Internet entities in order to share information, such as banking information, medical
information, etc. Additionally, Internet users must also trust entities they do not physically
know because those entities protect their virtual property. For example, many users must
trust other entities that store the virtual property of medical information, e-mail inboxes,
banking information, etc. So, a complication results in that Internet users are not able to
protect all of their virtual property; they must trust that other Internet entities are protecting
their virtual property. In some cases this situation prompts users to only share the minimum
amount of information, as Hobbes would, or to trust that there will be no abuse of their
virtual property, as Locke might. But Locke would understand that there could be some
abuses, so he would also favor having some protection of virtual property. He might favor
that Internet users share information only with entities that can be explicitly trusted or that
Internet users share the minimal information at the beginning of the relationship and
gradually build trust over time. It is clear that both Hobbesian and Lockean principles can be
used to describe Internet relationships, but I think there is more to describing the Internet;
and, I think we can better understand the Internet if we also recognize how Rousseauean
social contract principles can be used in the Internet.
Like Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau recognized that individuals in the state of nature
had the right to survive. But unlike Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau proposed a political
community where the individuals still retained the ultimate power. Understanding this point,
the Internet is a wonderful environment to explore this principle because there are many
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individual users with no clear central control. And in the Internet, it is possible for these
many individual users to interact quickly and efficiently. Another important point from
Rousseau‟s theory is that he recognized a general will, which was the will that worked for the
common good. Rousseau‟s ideal community was the community where the individuals in the
community retained ultimate power and made decisions according to the general will. To
explore this concept further and to illustrate how I surmise Rousseau‟s social contract theory
applies to the World Wide Web, I conducted three more investigations.
During my first study, I noticed that the trends that were listed on the Yahoo!® home
page changed frequently. To understand this phenomenon more clearly, I conducted a
second study. In this study, I again had controls and variables. The controls were that I
accessed the Yahoo!® home page from the same laptop, the same physical location, and on
the same night, October 5, 2010. The other control was that I repeated this access every 15
minutes or so. I wanted to track the changing trends to see how they changed over time in a
more controlled manner than during my first investigation. While the time intervals were
fairly consistent, the important control was that I repeated the same steps at each interval. In
the following figures, pay attention to the changing trends.
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Figure 13: Accessing Yahoo!® At 7:01 P.M.32

Figure 14: Accessing Yahoo!® At 7:18 P.M.33

32

(YH6)

33

(YH7)
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Figure 15: Accessing Yahoo!® At 7:34 P.M.34

Figure 16: Accessing Yahoo!® At 7:51 P.M.35

34

(YH8)

35

(YH9)
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Figure 17: Accessing Yahoo!® At 8:07 P.M.36

The following table synopsizes the above figures so that the changes in the trends are more
easily seen.

36

(YH10)
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Table 2: Variations in Yahoo!® Trends37
Time
Accessed /
Position

7:01 P.M.

7:18 P.M.

7:34 P.M.

7:51 P.M.

8:07 P.M.

1.

UFO
Sightings

UFO
Sightings

UFO
Sightings

UFO
Sightings

Lion Attack

2.

Marlo
Thomas

Lion Attack

Lion Attack

Rumer
Willis

Bret
Michaels

3.

Rumer
Willis

Rumer
Willis

Rumer
Willis

Lion Attack

Dana
Delany

4.

Stock Prices

Stock Prices

Stock Prices

Stock Prices

Stock Prices

5.

Weight Loss

Weight Loss

Weight Loss

Weight Loss

Weight Loss

6.

Susan Boyle

Marlo
Thomas

Marlo
Thomas

Marlo
Thomas

Jay Cutler

7.

Lisa Rinna

Susan Boyle

Lisa Rinna

Lisa Rinna

Danny
DeVito

8.

Keira
Knightley

Lisa Rinna

Susan Boyle

Jay Cutler

Taylor Swift

9.

Chile Mine
Rescue

Taylor Swift

Keira
Knightley

Taylor Swift

David
Archuleta

10.

Social
Security

Social
Security

Social
Security

Social
Security

Social
Security

I will not explain all of the trends, but I will draw out some points. During the course of
about an hour, “Stock Prices” and “Weight Loss” stayed at positions 4 and 5 while “Social
Security” stayed at position 10. “UFO Sightings” remained at the top until “Lion Attack”
took over the top spot. In fact, “Lion Attack” moved from position 2, then 3, then finally to
the top (YH6) (YH7) (YH8) (YH9) (YH10). According to "Yahoo Testing New 'Infinite
Browse' Module with News; 'Yahoo Trending Now' List Moves to Home Page," the
Trending Now list on the Yahoo!® home page indicates the popular searches that people are
making on the Yahoo!® search engine (Yahoo Testing New…Home Page). In other words,
the position of an item in the list indicates its popularity in searching by Internet users. The
37

Table 2 is compiled from data collected from Figures 13-17, derived from (YH6), (YH7), (YH8), (YH9), and
(YH10).
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higher the position of an item, the more Internet users are searching for that item using the
Yahoo!® search engine. I suspect that the active understanding and tracking of these trends
can give a hint of the general will in the sense that they are an indication of where the
interests of individuals are focused towards. As I explored before, the majority will does not
always conform to general will; but for practical purposes, the general will can be explored
through understanding the majority will. By understanding what the majority of Internet
users are exploring on the Internet, the general will of the Internet can also be explored. But,
this concept demanded further investigation. First, the trends that show up on the Yahoo!®
Trending Now list are only those trends that result from the Yahoo!® search engine. Second,
the Yahoo!® Trending Now lists I explored in my study are for a specific region 38. There are
different Trending Now lists when other regions around the world are considered. Given that
I could not address exploring the Trending Now lists around the world, I decided to at least
address the first issue by exploring search trends according to Google™. I conducted the
same study on November 6, 2010, but using the Google™ Trends site. The following figures
show the screenshots from my tracking of Google™ Trends39.

38

For this second study, I accessed Yahoo!® from a hotel in Washington, D.C. While I do know the Yahoo!®
Trending Now list is constrained to a particular region, I do not know the extent of that region, so the data I
collected could be for the hotel, the entire D.C area, the Northeast region of the U.S., the entire U.S., etc.
39

I conducted this study and the subsequent study from my home in El Paso, TX.
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Figure 18: Google™ Trends at 12:20 P.M.40

Figure 19: Google™ Trends at 12:36 P.M.41
40

(GT1)

41

(GT2)
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Figure 20: Google™ Trends at 12:51 P.M.42

Figure 21: Google™ Trends at 1:06 P.M.43
42

(GT3)

43

(GT4)
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Figure 22: Google™ Trends at 1:22 P.M.44

According to About Google™ Trends:
Hot Topics allows you to see a snapshot of what people are saying, by
viewing the topics with the most buzz in the news, on Twitter, FriendFeed, or
on other similar sources. Hot Topics are updated regularly…Hot Searches
reflects what people are searching for on Google today. Rather than showing
the most popular searches overall, which would always be generic terms like
“weather,” Hot Searches highlights searches that experience sudden surges in
popularity, and updates that information hourly. Our algorithm analyzes
millions of web searches performed on Google and displays those searches
that deviate the most from their historic traffic pattern. (About Google™
Trends).
This explanation shows why the “Hot Searches” didn‟t change much over the course of my
third study while the “Hot Topics” changed frequently. The following table shows the “Hot
Topics” variation over the course of my study.

44

(GT5)
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Table 3: Variations in Google™ Trends Hot Topics45
Time
Accessed /
Position

12:20 P.M.

12:36 P.M.

12:51 P.M.

1:06 P.M.

1:22 P.M.

1.

cam newton

xbox kinect

xbox kinect

kinect

healthcare
reform

2.

derek jeter

cam newton

30 rock

ben
bernanke

ben
bernanke

3.

andy irons

andy irons

nick lachey

cam newton
auburn

breeders cup
2010

4.

election
results

derek jeter

vanessa
minnillo

breeders cup
2010

cam newton
auburn

5.

chris
matthews

election
results

rudy
fernandez

love the way
you lie part
2

love the way
you lie part
2

6.

cuba plane
crash

ipad update

mobile
technology

30 rock

red wings

7.

oprah
winfrey

chris
matthews

50 most
popular
women

malloy

clearwire

8.

space shuttle

cooks source
magazine

skyfire
iphone

senkaku

julien hug
bachelorette

9.

love the way
you lie part
2 lyrics

dash nyc

austin collie

rudy
fernandez

undercovers

10.

mehserle
sentencing

space shuttle

amber alert

elizabeth
smart

skyfire
iphone

This study was conducted on a different date and from a different physical location, so the
data cannot be directly compared to the data collected from the Yahoo!® Trending Now list.
However, the data does show that over time the trends tracked on Google™ also vary
frequently as with the Yahoo!® search engine.
But to better understand the nature of Internet trends, I conducted another field
investigation across two days to track the trends as identified by both Yahoo!® and
Google™. For this investigation, I accessed both the Yahoo!® Trending Now list and the
Google™ Trends site at the same time and from the same physical location. I repeated this

45

Table 3 was compiled from data collected from Figures 18-22, derived from (GT1), (GT2), (GT3), (GT4),

100

access every fifteen minutes for an hour on November 13, 2010, and, again, on November
15, 2010. I hoped that there would be some similarity or other indication that Yahoo!® and
Google™ were identifying the same trends across the Internet. On November 13, I did not
find any similarities between the two sites. This result shows how very differently Yahoo!®
and Google™ track Internet trends. The screenshots from this investigation are in the
appendix. However on November 15, a similarity did appear in my observations. At 12:45
A.M. and, again, at 1:00 A.M., “Sarah Palin” showed up in the Yahoo!® Trending Now list
and “sarah palin alaska” showed up in the Google™ Hot Searches (GT11) (GT12) (YH16)
(YH17). These results are shown in the figures below. So despite the differences between
how these two companies track Internet trends, at these points in time both Yahoo!® and
Google™ identified “Sarah Palin” as a topic on interest on the Internet. What this indicates
is that if the Internet trends are tracked over time from multiple sources, more patterns will
emerge that will better indicate the true Internet trends. Understanding what the majority of
Internet users are exploring and how they are using the Internet will hint at the general will of
the collective of individual Internet users. Rousseau may not have envisioned his general
will would be explored in this fashion, but the key to Rousseau‟s social contract theory is
understanding the general will of the individuals in a community. As such, the general will
of the Internet must be explored through the wills of the individual Internet entities in the
community of the Internet; and, tracking Internet trends can become a tool in exploring these
wills.

and (GT5).
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Figure 23: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 12:45 A.M., 15 Nov.46

Figure 24: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 1:00 A.M., 15 Nov.47

46

(GT11) (YH16)

47

(GT12) (YH17)
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But, there are problems with tracking Internet trends. As stated earlier, the Yahoo!®
Trending Now list only shows what Yahoo!® identifies as trends as the Google™ Trends site
only shows what Google™ identifies as trends. Also, the data collection performed by
Google™ is not perfect. According to About Google™ Trends, “The data Trends produces
may contain inaccuracies for a number of reasons, including data-sampling issues and a
variety of approximations that are used to compute results. We hope you find this service
interesting and entertaining, but you probably wouldn‟t want to write your Ph.D. dissertation
based on the information provided by Trends.” And, there are also peculiarities with the
Google™ search engine. For example, according to Glen Levy:
The query, "Why Wont My Parakeet Eat My Diarrhea?" has rocketed to the
top of the Google charts by being a peculiar beneficiary of Google's automatic
search function, which fills out a phrase if a user begins a question with "Why
will not..." In layman's terms, Google takes previous searches from around the
world and the specific user and combines them to come up with the
suggestion…Clearly, some people have at some point in time have [sic]
genuinely wanted to know about the aforementioned parakeet and/or diarrhea.
And by word of mouth (and articles such as this), the surreal question has
caught on with people trying out the search function to see the end result for
themselves. Hilarity, presumably, has ensued. (Levy).
This article identifies two issues with the Google™ search engine and search engines, in
general. First, the programming that helps search engines perform more efficiently for users
can produce unexpected results, such as the question above, that do not necessarily make
sense. Second, people‟s searches can be influenced by the search engine, even when the
searches do not make sense, or from other sources in the Internet, such as the above article.
In other words, it becomes problematic to determine which has the greater influence in
popular Internet searches: the actual searches people perform or the programming behind the
search engines themselves. It is most likely influenced by both sources, but it becomes
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difficult to determine which is most responsible for the Internet search trends. Also when
Internet users see the trends, it may fuel more searches for those trends as users explore why
they are trends in the first place. However, even with these issues, people still show interest
in exploring trends. For example, Yahoo!® posts the weekly search trends every Friday.
Pamela Woon from ABC News presents these trends every week on ABC. In "Weekly
Yahoo! Search Trends-November 5, 2010," the trends that were identified were searches for
“Daylight Savings Time” and “Holiday Shopping” (Weekly Yahoo!…2010). These trends
are not surprising when in the non-virtual world, Daylight Savings Time took place on
November 7, 2010, and Christmas is just around the corner from November 5.
While the issue of studying Internet trends, in terms of how people are using the
Internet, is a large issue that cannot be fully explored in this thesis, it is clear that trends can
be one data point in understanding how the collective of individuals on the Internet are
focused. As such, Internet trends are an indicator of Rousseau‟s general will in the Internet
community. There are the same issues that Rousseau identified, such as general will helps
form the sovereign at the same time the sovereign influences the general will, in the sense
that search trends can influence more searching that fuels the trends that are being shown.
Also the search trends track the majority in searching, and as stated earlier, the majority will
does not always conform to the general will. While there are problems in understanding the
Internet trends, there are also problems with Rousseau‟s general will in that Rousseau
vaguely describes the general will because it is intended to be vague so that it conforms to
what is good for everyone. However, understanding the collective of individuals on the
Internet through Rousseau‟s social contract theory provides a new way to understand Internet
relationships, as with the theories of Hobbes and Locke, which presents a new way to
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investigate Internet ethical issues through these relationships and how they govern the
Internet community. With these investigations and studies, a new picture of the Internet
emerges.

Figure 25: The Internet as a Social Contract

In my example above, I show a Hobbesian Individual. This person would be the Internet
user that mistrusts other Internet users. As such he does not have a connection to the other
individual, only the Hobbesian Company.

The Hobbesian Company has a Lockean

Relationship with the Hobbesian Individual.

This relationship could be a business

relationship that is necessary, such as banking. In the Hobbesian Company, the company has
Lockean Relationships with its employees as necessary for business productivity.

The

employees have Lockean Relationships with each other as they must cooperate to survive in
the company.

The Hobbesian Company also extends control over its property and

employees.

The Hobbesian Company has a Lockean Relationship with the Lockean

Individual.

The Lockean Individual differs from the Hobbesian Individual in that the
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Lockean would not generally mistrust the other Internet users. Over the entire Internet cloud,
Rousseau‟s general will emerges. The main point to understand in this investigation that I
have conducted is that the structure of the Internet allows for multiple relationships and
multiple ways to understand classical social contract theory in the Internet. Additionally,
Internet users can take on different aspects of social contract theory depending on the Internet
relationships they are maintaining. This aspect of classical social contract theory in the
Internet is not surprising when you remember that single Internet users can have multiple
virtual identities on the Internet. Personally, I have six different e-mail addresses. Four
addresses are connected to me personally for banking, education, and other Internet tasks that
require my identity be known.

But, two addresses are designed with non-personal

information. I use these addresses when I want to contact a website or Internet user I do not
personally know or trust. In a sense, I have Lockean relationships with those entities that I
trust or with which I have a business or personal relationship. But, I become Hobbesian
when I deal with entities I do not personally know. So even at the single user level, both
Lockean and Hobbesian principles can emerge.
I am not the first person to explore social contract theory on the Internet. In “Social
Contract for the Internet Community? Historical and Philosophical Theories as Basis for the
Inclusion of Civil Society in Internet Governance?,” Rolf H. Weber and Romana Weber
propose Rousseauean social contract theory as a solution for Internet governance (Weber).
They stated:
Netizens are affected by decisions taken with regard to Internet governance
and should therefore be able to influence such. However, the heterogeneity of
Internet users requires special efforts in order to find a method of consensus
building which includes all interested parties and creates the opportunity to
make decisions acceptable for as large a part of the civil community as
possible. Nothwithstanding the fact that the Internet society is a newly
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emerging civil society, considerations taken into account in earlier contexts
can lead to valuable lessons. In this respect, a theory which seems to offer a
feasible approach encompasses the concept of a so-called “social contract”
that is historically and philosophically addressing issues of civil society‟s
participation. (Weber 90).
Their position, as highlighted in this excerpt, is that because of the vast diversity in the
Internet community, a social contract is needed to allow as many “netizens” as possible to
participate in decision-making on the Internet.

They further stated that “Through the

establishment of a civil society, each individual is protected by the whole of the
community…each individual should be granted with the same rights and obligations in the
sense of the same chance to development for everyone, in particular with respect to the use of
freedom by having the social contract which secures the self-determination of all individuals”
(Weber 90). To clarify further, Weber and Weber envision Internet governance as happening
through a forum where every citizen has representation. Each citizen‟s voice contributes to
the general will on the Internet, and Internet governance decisions are made based on this
general will. As Weber and Weber stated:
All aspects of the Internet may have an impact on its daily use by civil society.
Without any doubts, civil society is the most active user of the Internet and
therefore the most concerned player…The inclusion of civil society calls for a
bottom-up process…This bottom-up approach may be implemented in
practice by establishing a hierarchical framework, in which representatives
from all regions are elected by the population. These representatives may
have to, in a second phase, elect individuals amongst themselves who then are
legitimate representatives of the whole population and have the power to
govern the Internet. (Weber 94).
While I agree with Weber and Weber that the structure of the Internet lends itself to social
contract theory, I do not agree with their application. There are several points that I feel they
have not addressed, and I feel they are important points that affect their argument. I will
address these points now.
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Weber and Weber have established a theory for Internet governance that is very
idealistic in the sense that it calls for a framework where the vast majority of “netizens”
participate in the decision-making on how the Internet is managed. But, the first point I feel
they have not completely addressed is the physical nature of the Internet. They do partially
address the physical Internet in the following: “This theoretical concept [Weber and Weber‟s
proposal], of course, implies that the possibility to access the Internet in all geographical
areas is equal; since this is actually not the case for the time being, access needs to be
increased.

This may require developed countries to provide technical assistance and

financing to less well-situated regions…” (Weber 103). In this statement, Weber and Weber
at least acknowledge the physical structure of the Internet in that they recognize that some
geographical regions may not have the same access to the Internet as others. For example in
my first investigation, it was shown that there were several redundant areas so that I was able
to access my destination from several locations around El Paso.

Less-developed

geographical regions may not have such redundancies and may only have limited physical
access points into the Internet. But what Weber and Weber fail to emphasize is that since
there is a physical infrastructure, there is not as much diversity as Weber and Weber note.
Let me clarify what I mean by this statement. There are thousands of people in El Paso that
access the Internet, but there are considerably fewer actual physical relays to the Internet.
Additionally, there are pockets of physical structures that are controlled by fewer entities
than the people that use them. For example a business may have hundreds of users, but the
physical structure of computers, routers, etc. is controlled and managed by the business
owners and their appointed representatives. So while Weber and Weber correctly recognize
that there is vast diversity among Internet users, they fail to highlight that physical access can
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be controlled by relatively fewer entities which makes the physical structure less diverse than
the virtual structure.

They fail to note that entities control various sizes of physical

infrastructure depending on their financial capability. For example a business may own
hundreds of computers and enough routers to support them, while I as a private citizen have
two computers and two routers over which I have control. So there are not as many entities
that control the physical infrastructure of the Internet, and it is not certain if they have the
same diversity as the users of the virtual Internet which contains any individual that accesses
the Internet. Weber and Weber at least acknowledge this condition when they stated that
“[a]t this time, only a minority of active netizens control the functioning of the Internet and
take [sic] decisions relating to Internet governance” (Weber 94). Weber and Weber propose
that Rousseau‟s social contract theory can be used to implement Internet governance, but
they do not emphasize that there is already Internet governance because entities control
various parts of the physical infrastructure; and, these entities can impose their own rules on
the physical infrastructure as I detailed earlier in my first study with the West and East El
Paso businesses. The next point that I feel Weber and Weber do not realize is that social
contract relationships already exist on the Internet.

Weber and Weber propose that

Rousseauean social contract theory is needed to govern the Internet. However as I have
demonstrated, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Rousseauean theories are already in place on the
Internet due in part to how the physical infrastructure has developed to allow the virtual
Internet to exist, but also in the relationships emerging in this virtual Internet. Weber and
Weber do not recognize that 1) social contract theory is already apparent in the Internet and
2) that Hobbesian and Lockean theories are present as well, not just Rousseauean social
contract theory.
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Weber and Weber‟s claim that Internet governance can be fruitfully addressed
through classical social contract theory is a general claim with which I agree, but their
investigation doesn‟t go far enough. First, they did not place as much importance on the
physical structure of the Internet as they did on the virtual structure of the Internet. As I have
demonstrated, the Internet, both its virtual and physical aspects, can be explored and
understood through classical social contract theory. The multiple facets of the Internet allow
for multiple levels of relationships among Internet entities so that individual entities can have
Hobbesian relationships with the community of entities as a whole, but still have Lockean
relationships with a smaller community of trusted entities. Companies can have Lockean
relationships with their employees and other companies, while at the same time employing
Hobbesian absolute control over their physical and virtual infrastructure. And, there are
trends in Internet searching that indicate in some degree the direction that Internet users are
exploring the Internet. Could this trending also be indicative of Rousseau‟s general will,
since majority will sometimes aligns with the general will? Weber and Weber do not
acknowledge these multiple levels of relationships even though they stated that “[a]s
technical progress is enormous, new possibilities for participation may be discovered…”
(Weber 96). Like Weber and Weber, I have investigated social contract theory as a way of
understanding Internet governance. However, I employed the theories of three philosophers
because I recognized that Internet governance is already taking place in the Internet on
various levels; and, I place as much importance on the physical aspect of the Internet as the
virtual aspect. The complexities of the Internet require such multiple viewpoints; but, the
investigation and field studies I performed did raise additional questions and concerns that I
address in my final chapter.
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Chapter 4-Conclusion
As I stated in my introduction when I began this odyssey, I wanted to investigate how
ethical issues can be explored on the Internet.

Although the decentralization and

redundancies of the Internet allow for a network that is highly adaptive and functional, it has
created problems in understanding the various interactions and relationships that exist on the
Internet. It also has created issues with responsibility and trust as the Internet is beyond all
political borders, and it is possible to interact with Internet users without knowing their true
identities.

These issues create problems when attempting to understand ethics on the

Internet. For example, if we consider Utilitarianism, how do we measure what decisions
support the greatest happiness if the Internet community is formed of individuals, companies,
and governments around the world that have very different perspectives? Because of these
and other issues, I realized that before even attempting to understand the ethical issues on the
Internet, I needed to first understand the interactions and relationships on the Internet beyond
the technical aspects with which I am familiar. Instead, I needed to understand the Internet in
a different way that would allow me to explore how the Internet community as a whole
functions and can support an ethical framework. In this task, I decided to explore the Internet
through the lens of classical social contract theory as a first step to understanding the ethics
of the Internet.

And as I have demonstrated, aspects of Hobbesian, Lockean, and

Rousseauean principles emerge in how the Internet is structured and in the various
relationships that can develop in the virtual Internet.
There are several challenges in viewing the Internet through social contract theory.
First, you must recognize that a key difference between Hobbes and Locke was in how they
each viewed basic human nature.

Hobbes viewed humans as brutal; whereas, Locke
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recognized humans could reason and cooperate. Knowing this key difference, you will
realize that if Hobbesians and Lockeans appear on the Internet, they will interact with the
Internet very differently from each other. Hobbesians will not immediately trust other
Internet users as Lockeans might. Second, in order to apply Lockean principles to the
Internet, we must understand how the concept of property transfers to the Internet
environment. As noted earlier, this examination becomes problematic because there is both
physical and virtual property on the Internet. A case in point: Internet users could find that
they have virtual property that resides on some other Internet entity‟s physical property. For
example I consider my e-mail inbox virtual property, but it resides on physical structures that
are owned by Google™. While this relationship allows me to access my e-mail inbox from
across the United States, I must trust Google™ to protect my virtual property. Third, if we
attempt to understand the general will of Rousseau in terms of Internet trends, we run into
issues of how to understand the different trend trackers, such as Yahoo!® and Google™, and
how the results of the various trend trackers can be understood together. The trend trackers
do have inaccuracies; and there is the issue of how the trend trackers can influence the very
trends they are tracking, like Rousseau‟s sovereign influences and is influenced by the
general will. But, the trends do provide some indication about the direction that Internet
users are moving in terms of Internet use. If the trends could be tracked accurately from
multiple aspects, including the different regions around the world, aspects of the general will
can be ascertained. For example, the majority of Internet users may be using the Internet for
social networking instead of business.

Or, more Internet users may be interested in

entertainment than politics. This trend examination would be complicated, but it is not
merely because of the difficulty of understanding the physical and virtual aspects of the
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Internet and how the many individual entities are using the Internet. It is also complicated
because Rousseau provided an obscure definition of the general will in a community of
individuals.
Despite these difficulties, examining the Internet with the help of classical social
contract theory as I‟ve interpreted it provides a foundation for exploring critical ethical issues
on the Internet, such as competing business interactions, banking concerns, privacy issues,
intellectual property issues, social networking, hacking, Internet stalking, identity theft,
software piracy, and trust issues. But these and other ethical issues can now be addressed
through Hobbesian or Lockean structures, for example, which provide a clearer way to
understand how ethics should be applied. Hobbesians will be less trusting of the Internet and
other users, so Hobbesians may want to act from an ethical model rooted in survival and
protection. Lockeans will establish trust relationships while having some protection against
outsiders.

As such, Lockeans will act from an ethical model that allows trust and

cooperation. And, Hobbesians and Lockeans can take action in both the physical and virtual
worlds of the Internet to employ these models. And, Internet users can be Hobbesian in some
relationships while employing Lockean principles in other relationships. Until the general
will is understood, it would be difficult to show how the Internet as a whole, as the collective
of individuals, would act. But once the general will is understood, it may be possible to
create ethical models that conform to and guide the general will of the Internet as Rousseau‟s
sovereign would guide a political community. Through understanding Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau in the context of the Internet, it becomes possible to understand Internet
governance in the physical and virtual aspects of the Internet so that ethical issues can be
practically addressed using these already existing relationships.
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The previous work by

Weber and Weber in exploring Rousseau‟s social contract theory as a solution for Internet
governance began this examination; but, their work did not go far enough because they did
not acknowledge that there were already implicit relationships on the Internet that conform to
Hobbesian and Lockean principles. And, they did not fully address the physical structure of
the Internet and the complications it introduces in understanding the Internet through social
contract theory.
Before I end my thesis, I will address why I approached understanding the Internet
through classical social contract theory instead of other models48.

From my technical

understanding of the Internet, I understand the Internet as comprised of various individuals,
whether they are single users, companies, states, countries, etc. as I described throughout my
thesis.

As such, I wanted to explore how individuals form themselves into functional

communities with rules. Social contract theory appeared ideal for this effort; and, as social
contract theory has been around since the 1600s, there is a wealth of information available
for understanding social contract theory, including oppositional material. There are also
established real-world examples of classical social contract theory; for example, the
governing structure of the United States of America is partly based on Lockean social
contract theory. After my research and examination, I‟m certain that other models can also
be applied to the Internet; but I‟m also certain that exploring ethical issues on the Internet
must first begin by understanding the Internet not as the technical tool it started as, but as the
vast community it has become with its various individuals at different levels interacting in a
variety of ways. As classical social contract theory has been used to explore how individuals
form political communities in the real-world, it is then possible to explore how Internet

48

Some examples of models I did not explore are game theory and modern social contract theory.
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communities form through classical social contract theory.

Understanding the Internet

through the theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau provides practical structures to
investigate ethical issues in the Internet. And, the relationships on the Internet can then be
compared to real-world equivalents for even better understanding of the ethical implications
that result from the relationships and interactions on the Internet.

The Internet is

complicated, and any models that apply to the Internet will necessarily be complicated as
well. Classical social contract theory provides a way to navigate this complexity in a more
practical way, which allows for practically exploring Internet ethics. My final point is that
while the Internet is complicated, it is functional; and, we cannot ignore the practical
relationships that have developed on the Internet when developing a model for how the
Internet functions or how ethics can work in the Internet community.
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Appendix-Concurrent Access of Yahoo!®’s Trending Now List and Google™ Trends

Figure 26: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 5:00 P.M., 13 Nov.50
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Figure 27: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 5:15 P.M., 13 Nov.51

Figure 28: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 5:30 P.M., 13 Nov.52
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Figure 29: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 5:46 P.M., 13 Nov.53

Figure 30: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 6:00 P.M., 13 Nov.54
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Figure 31: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 12:45 A.M., 15 Nov.55

Figure 32: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 1:00 A.M., 15 Nov.56
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Figure 33: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 1:16 A.M., 15 Nov.57

Figure 34: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 1:30 A.M., 15 Nov.58
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Figure 35: Yahoo!® Trending Now List and Google™ Trends at 1:45 A.M., 15 Nov.59
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